“LESS IS MORE”: NEW PROPERTY PARADIGM
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ABSTRACT
Before striking down laws increasing copyright’s domain,
judges and legislators are asking for evidence that information
products will be created even if copyright protection is not
provided. The future of Internet technology depends on locating
this evidence in time to limit expansive copyright. United States
law, however, already protects information products under
copyright. Hence, this counterfactual evidence that judges
request cannot be generated in the United States. In response to
the demand for data, American legal scholars have attempted to
mine evidence from open software and other non-commercial
endeavors on the Internet. However, these endeavors have been
dismissed as exceptions or “cults,” unrelated to mainstream
industry needs.
This Article, for the first time, provides evidence of growth in
the commercial software industry without intellectual property
protection. Between 1993 and 2010, the software industry in
India emerged as the fastest growing in the world, accounting
for $76 billion in revenues by 2010. In the same time period, the
software industry in India remained unaffected by changes in
intellectual property protection for software. By demonstrating
industry growth without strong intellectual property protections,
the Indian data fills the critical gap in American literature.
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Moreover, the comparative data from India enables scholars
to separate causality from outcomes in specific empirical and
analytical studies emerging out of the United States. In the case
study of California’s Silicon Valley, for instance, there is a risk
that causality may be extrapolated to alternative California
statutes, giving rise to errors of second order. The comparative
analysis checks this potential inaccuracy. The industry in India
also provides illuminating data from contracting practices—
decisive evidence of the legal infrastructure firms need and will
create by contract, if not found in a priori law. This study equips
policy-makers to go beyond the “historic accident” explanation
to understand why the software industry flourishes where it does.

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court and Congress ask for evidence that
information production would occur even without copyright protection.
Absent this evidence, the Court and Congress are unwilling to impose
limits on copyright law.1 For instance, this unavailability of evidence was
the determining factor in upholding the law challenged in Eldred, which
increased the term of copyright.2
1

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) [hereinafter Eldred]. See LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO
LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 128 (2004) [hereinafter
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE] (discussing Eldred and Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
request for empirical evidence of information production that would have
occurred without copyright). See also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (drawing attention to the fact that 98 percent of work for which
copyright was being extended was no longer commercially available anyway);
Kahle v. Ashcroft, No. C-04-1127 MMC, 2004 WL 2663157 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
19, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Kahle v. Gonzalez, 487 F.3d 697 (9th Cir. 2007)
(called “Eldred Version 2” by Lessig; focusing on the 98 percent of the work
whose copyright was being extended even though they were no longer
commercially available, as Justice Breyer had pointed out in Eldred). See also
Lawrence Lessig, Does Copyright Have Limits? Eldred v. Ashcroft and its
Aftermath, in OPEN CONTENT LICENSING: CULTIVATING THE CREATIVE
COMMONS 11, 21 (Brian Fitzgerald et al. eds., Sydney Univ. Press 2007).
2
See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 124, 128. Lessig believes Justice
Kennedy’s question on this point determined the outcome, and was decisive in
the ruling on the constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.
Others believe the Supreme Court was more concerned about whether Congress
had the power to extend copyright term than any other issue in Eldred. See id. at
128 (referring to Justice Sandra O’Connor’s question during oral hearings).
Lessig, however, argues the former issue was far more pivotal because if the
Court felt it was inappropriate to intervene, it would not have granted the
petition. Remarkably, the Supreme Court had granted the petition to review the
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On the one hand, copyright scholars, artists, and educators
challenge strengthened copyright protection as inimical to innovation and
free speech. Copyright protection has expanded through increases in term
and enhanced rights over digital work.3 The cumulative increases in
copyright protection, when combined with new technologies, enable
greater control by copyright holders and strain free speech and
innovation.4
Judges, on the other hand, are reluctant to strike down an
increase in copyright protection as unnecessary or as disfavoring
progress. Judges fear that if they accept the argument that recent
increases in copyright chill innovation, ipso facto, they will also need to
consider striking down past term expansions or copyright law in toto as
unnecessary or inimical to progress.5 Judges are thus concerned that their
D.C. Court of Appeals decision, even though the Court rarely reviews a decision
by a circuit court when no other court has reviewed it. Id. at 123. For a detailed
history, see Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); aff’d, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C. Cir. 2001); reh’g & reh’g en banc denied, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001);
cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002); order granting cert. amended, 534 U.S.
1160 (2002).
3
See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Pub. L. No. 105-298,
§ 102, 112 Stat. 2828, 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–304 (2006))
(extending the term of copyright). The CTEA is also known by the moniker “the
Mickey Mouse Copyright Act.” The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2863 (1998) (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205 (2006)) increased the control over digital work. For a
discussion on the impact of the DMCA, see also STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS
OF OPEN SOURCE 210 (2004) [hereinafter WEBER, OPEN SOURCE] (arguing the
protection over digitized products now “essentially tries to constrain
technologies that are thought to pose a threat to the copyright regime, rather than
punish conduct in violation of copyright per se.”); Yochai Benkler, Free as the
Air To Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 415 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, First
Amendment and Enclosure] (pointing out the DMCA prevents circumvention
per se and not just the rights protected under copyright); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE,
supra note 1, at 157.
4
For a discussion on how expansive copyright in the Internet age will impede
exercise of free speech, see Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic
Culture: A Theory of Freedom for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
51 (2004) (arguing that aspects of free speech are “foregrounded” by digital
technologies). See also LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1 (discussing an
expansive copyright’s adverse impact on free speech and innovation).
5
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 128 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s
questions during oral arguments in Eldred. Justice Kennedy had argued, “I
suppose implicit in the argument that the ’76 act, too, should have been declared
void, and that we might leave it alone because of the disruption, is that for all
these years the act has impeded progress in science and the useful arts. I just
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ruling on recent expansions in copyright may potentially imperil a threecentury-old law.6 The judges’ quagmire is made even more difficult
when stakeholders such as Walt Disney & Co. and media houses owning
copyright portfolios provide estimates of financial losses that would
occur if the proposed additional protection is denied.7 This loss estimate
strikes a powerful chord and makes it hard for Congress to reject
expansions in intellectual property (IP) on the basis of vague, potential
claims (that free speech or innovation would have occurred without
copyright).8
Marshaling clear evidence that an increase in copyright law
would “impede progress” is imperative because the Supreme Court has
just upheld the constitutionality of another copyright extension. In Golan
v. Holder,9 the Supreme Court confronted the question of whether
Congress has the power to restore copyright for foreign works that were
previously in the public domain in the United States. The core issues
were (1) whether the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which brought
some works whose copyright had lapsed back under copyright, violated
the First Amendment, and (2) whether Congress had modified the
traditional contours of copyright and violated the original constitutional
mandate.10 The Supreme Court, however, answered these questions in
the negative.

don’t see any empirical evidence for that.”). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor also
voiced similar concerns on how this ruling would affect old acts, which had
extended copyright term in the past. Id.
6
See, e.g., Margaret McKeown, Happy Birthday Statute of Anne: The Dance
Between the Courts and Congress, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145 (2010).
7
Such representations were made before Congress when the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act for instance was being debated. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm., Trade, & Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Commerce,
105th Cong. 56, 58 (1998) (testimony of Steven J. Metalitz on behalf of Motion
Picture Association of America defending anticircumvention provision as
necessary for robust electronic commerce); id. at 45 (statement of Hilary B.
Rosen, President and Chief Executive Officer, Recording Industry Association
of America, supporting anticircumvention). The software industry was more
fractured; for details, see Benkler, First Amendment and Enclosure, supra note
3, at 421–22.
8
Balkin, supra note 4.
9
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
10
Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 2011 U.S.
LEXIS 1972 (U.S. Mar. 7, 2011) (No. 10-545), argued Oct. 5, 2011. For case
history, see http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles
/10-545.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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Hence, the Court’s search for evidence of information
production without IP protections (“IP without IP,” according to
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss) continues to have enormous significance.11
American legal scholars have studied various creative endeavors that
appear to be flourishing on the Internet even without strong IP
protection. Among these creative endeavors, software development has
been one of the most successful, and hence, legal scholars have zeroed in
on and focused specially on software.12 Moreover, the software industry
thrives on innovation, and IP protection is presumed to be important. The
software industry is also increasingly important to the economy,13 so the
question of how to optimize incentives in the form of IP protections for
this industry is especially important.14
Advocates of stronger copyright, however, dismiss as “cults”
open-source and the various non-commercial instances of software
development that American legal scholars have mined.15 Moreover, these
advocates point out proprietary software is the norm and the vast
majority of software programs are made available under existing
copyright and patent laws.16 Thus, it is difficult for American legal
scholars to prove that industry will create software and information
products even without copyright.

11

See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1437 (2010).
12
Open source code or code that is freely distributed is responsible for most of
the innovative programming powering the Internet, operating systems, and
software. Leaving source code open has generated some of the most
sophisticated developments in computer software, including, most notably,
Linux and Apache, which pose a significant challenge to Microsoft in the
marketplace. See WEBER, OPEN SOURCE, supra note 3, at 5.
13
See infra Part II.A.1 for the software industry’s contribution to the Indian
economy.
14
This argument has been raised previously albeit in the context of the fashion
industry. See C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and
Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1152 (2009).
15
Robert L. Glass, The Sociology of Open Source: Of Cults and Cultures, 17
IEEE SOFTWARE 104, 104 (2000), available at http://www.computer.org/portal
/web/csdl/doi/10.1109/MS.2000.10027.
16
Id. Some scholars argue that these creative endeavors flourishing without IP
protections are based upon pre-existing IP regimes. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra
note 11; Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software: Do Property
Rights Still Matter?, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Mann,
Commercializing Open Source Software]. For more details of this argument, see
infra Part I.B.2.
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Part of the problem is historical impossibility. Evidence of
information production without IP protection, particularly from
commercial industry, would be difficult to locate in the United States.17
As Ronald Mann argues: “[D]espite the contrary mythology of a golden
age of IP freedom, it is not clear that there was any time when software
was not protected [in the United States].”18 It is difficult to demonstrate
the counterfactual: innovation and information production would have
occurred in the United States even without IP rights.19
In this context, the experience of other countries in which
significant production of software takes place is therefore instructive. In
fact, India provides evidence from the commercial software industry that
can precisely fill this gap. In recent years, India introduced laws
providing copyright and patent protection for software (in 1995 and 2004
respectively). Thus, India’s legal history captures a “natural experiment”
that tests the causal relationship between IP protection and developments
in the software industry.20 Moreover, after protecting software under
patents in 2004, India withdrew the law that provided the patent cover in
April 2005. This legal change simulates a second “experiment” to test
whether a reduction in IP protection would affect the industry.21

17

Some scholars argue that even though the United States had copyright and
patent laws on the books, the protection was, in fact, not particularly robust. For
instance, they point out the United States only recognized copyright in works
published in the country, and publishers could without fear of legal action
publish foreign works without the permission of foreign authors. See, e.g.,
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 48. See generally LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE, supra note 1 (arguing that protectionism was not part of “American
culture” in the past).
18
Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?,
83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 972 (2005) [hereinafter Mann, Financing].
19
See, e.g., Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16, at 3
(arguing it is difficult to analyze the problem of whether or not to abandon
patents for software industry without quantifying the benefits that the
commercial software industry derives from IP).
20
See J. DiNardo, Natural Experiments and Quasi-natural Experiments, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E.
Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (“Natural experiments or quasi-natural experiments in
economics are serendipitous situations in which persons are assigned randomly
to a treatment (or multiple treatments) and a control group, and outcomes are
analy[z]ed for the purposes of putting a hypothesis to a severe test; they are also
serendipitous situations where assignment to treatment ‘approximates’
randomized design or a well-controlled experiment.”).
21
For a prior example of the empirical strategy of using a “second experiment”
as a “double check,” see Bert Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1126 (2011).
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The strong growth of the software industry in India makes the
country a particularly apt site to test for the connection between IP
protection and growth. Between 1993 and 2010, the software industry22
in India achieved the fastest growth rate in the world and emerged as a
multi-billion dollar industry.23 In addition, this industry is a key
economic sector, accounting for over 6.1 percent of the gross domestic
product (GDP) in fiscal year 2010.24 The industry is well regarded,
credited with playing a strong role in India’s economic rise and for
refashioning India’s image worldwide. India emerged as the secondfastest growing economy in the world in 2008 and even posted the
highest growth rate of 10.4 percent in 2010.25
22

Note that in this Article, I use the word “software,” which is more prevalent in
the United States, and provides uniformity and avoids confusion. In India, the
industry uses “software,” “information technology,” and other terms
synonymously, but there are no semantic differences that would affect the
central thesis of this Article.
23
See NASSCOM REPORT, THE IT BPO SECTOR IN INDIA: STRATEGIC REVIEW –
2011 5 (Sanketh Arouje ed., 2011).
24
DUN & BRADSTREET INDIA REPORT, INDIA’S TOP ITES AND BPO COMPANIES
2010 (2010) [hereinafter DUN & BRADSTREET REPORT], available at http://www.
dnb.co.in/ITeSBpo2010/ITeSBPO.asp (last visited May 5, 2011). The software
industry’s contribution to India’s total exports grew from 4 percent to 26 percent
from FY98 to FY10. See, e.g., N.R. Narayanmurthy, The IT Industry has Given
India Wings, ECON. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2008), http://articles.economic
times.indiatimes.com/2008-11-26/news/27705078_1_software-industry-industry
-leaders-corporate-governance. See Economy of India, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Economy_of_India (last visited Apr. 7, 2011). For
instance, Infosys Technologies Ltd., one of India’s leading software firms was
founded in India in 1981 with $250. Infosys became listed on the NASDAQ
within two decades of its inception and earned $6.04 billion in the first quarter
of 2011. What We Do, INFOSYS, http://www.infosys.com/about/what-wedo/pages/index.aspx (last visited May 2, 2011).
25
India’s growth rate in 2010 surpassed even China’s growth rate by 0.1
percent, according to the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic
Outlook. See IMF, World Economic Outlook: Tensions from the Two-Speed
Recovery, WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS 20 (2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf. See also The X
factor: Which of Asia’s Emerging Giants Grew Faster in 2010?, ECONOMIST
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18586836; Amartya Sen,
Quality of Life: India v. China, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 12, 2011), available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/12/quality-life-india-vschina/; DAVID SMITH, THE DRAGON AND THE ELEPHANT: CHINA, INDIA AND THE
NEW WORLD ORDER (2007); Martin Wolf, India’s Elephant Charges on through
the Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2010), http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/750747e0262c-11df-aff3-00144feabdc0.html-axzz1Dg7FK3Yi; Lehman collapse: India’s
Economic Elephant is Still on the Move 12 Months On, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 15,
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In this Article, data and analysis are provided to address the
important question of the connection between strong IP protection and
growth in software, an industry that thrives on innovation. It joins other
industry case studies—on fashion, stand-up comedy, and recipes—in
questioning whether IP law is appropriate for that particular industry.26
This Article has important implications for the larger debate on whether
strong IP protection fuels growth. But it is not argued that IP protection
is irrelevant in all contexts. It may well be pertinent to pharmaceuticals
or industries with high research and development (R&D) costs.27 This
Article simply inquires whether the software industry depends upon
copyright, and the claims in this Article are limited to the software
industry.28

2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/6183664
/Lehman-collapse-Indias-economic-elephant-is-still-on-the-move-12-monthson.html; Nicholas Vardy, The Elephant Awakes: The Remarkable Rise of India,
GLOBAL GURU (Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.theglobalguru.com/articl
e.php?id=193&offer=GURU.
26
For a case study on the role of IP in the fashion industry, see Hemphill & Suk,
supra note 14, at 1151 (arguing “for a limited right against design copying”);
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). For other
examples, such as stand-up comedy and cuisine, see Dotan Oliar & Christopher
Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual
Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV.
1787 (2008); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces:
Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007). For a discussion on authors’ incentives in the digital
age, see Diane Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering
Incentives in a Digital Age, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1121 (2003). See also Diane
Zimmerman, Living Without Copyright in a Digital World, 70 ALB. L. REV.
1375 (2007).
27
See Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16; Dreyfuss,
supra note 11.
28
This Article shall confine the patent study in order to support the main
findings with regard to the limited reliance that the software industry places on
copyright and IP. This Article does not intend to make any other sweeping or
general universal claims with regard to patent law. Software patent protection in
India has been included solely for the purpose of completeness, avoiding a
potential objection. Readers may think perhaps the reason copyright protection
does not affect the software industry is because the industry is counting on
alternate IP protection. In the aforementioned Parts II.B.2 and 3, I demonstrate
this is also not true. For criticisms against industry studies that only consider one
form of IP (for instance, fashion industry studies that only evaluated copyright
and not trademarks, which are hugely relevant to that industry), see Dreyfuss,
supra note 11, at 1450.
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This Article will proceed as follows: Part I.A will outline the
bedrock issues of, and conflict between, technology and copyright law in
the United States. Part I.B will examine newer theories put forth on the
basis of open-source and non-commercial sector performance. Even
though this Article focuses on software, it will examine theories
emerging from various creative endeavors (Internet Theories) over and
above software examples. The critical analysis in this Part identifies
significant gaps in these theories that prevent the supporting studies from
being persuasive evidence of “IP without IP.” The strong-copyright camp
points out open-source projects are based on incentives structures and a
priori IP. Programmers and firms gain benefits from participating in
open software—programmers are able to signal to future employers
supplementary skills they possess and firms are able to increase market
share.29 Moreover, Professors Ronald Mann and Rochelle Dreyfuss
respectively point to two conclusions: (a) open software is in fact
supported by monetary and other contributions from proprietary software
firms,30 and (b) open software is based on the attribution norm, which is
predicated on a pre-existing IP regime.31 In other words, programmers
exercise rights and participate in open software development on the basis
of prior IP rights, negating open software as evidence of information
production without IP. Thus, even though these Internet Theories show
progress, they fail to provide clear evidence of “IP without IP” that
judges and legislators alike seek in order to limit copyright expansions.32
Part II will provide evidence of “IP without IP” from the
commercial software industry in India. This data provides an additional
benefit—because it stems from commercial industry, unlike the other
examples from the non-commercial sector, this evidence cannot be
dismissed as an exception (or “cult”). As for the data, it is plain and
essentially tells the story: the industry growth rate did not surge when
copyright and patent protections were introduced for software in 1995
and 2004 respectively. The picture that emerges shows industry growth
is unaffected by changes in IP protection. One objection may be the
clichéd cost advantage. Software may be booming in India because of
cheap labor or lower-end back-office services.33 Another objection is that
the Indian software industry perhaps does not produce patent- or

29

See, e.g., Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16.
Dreyfuss, supra note 11.
31
Id.
32
Dreyfuss argues these are actually predicated on pre-existing IP protections,
pointing toward the strong emphasis on attribution norm, for instance. For
details, see infra Part II.A.3.
33
See infra Part II.A.3.
30
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copyright-worthy products. In Parts II.A.5 and II.B generally, I will
discuss and disprove such anticipated objections to this data.
The withdrawal of patent protection in April 2005 allows us to
test a second and related hypothesis—that industry will remain
unaffected by a decrease in IP protection. The industry growth rate
showed no fall after the withdrawal of patents. Remarkably, industry was
silent and did not endorse patents or any other increase in IP. Interpreting
silence is usually difficult, but in this case it corroborates our growth data
and helps to eliminate several anticipated objections, which shall be
discussed in Part II.B. Indeed, it is hard to argue that industry depends
upon IP protection, and yet does not protest a decrease in IP protection.
Though this Article focuses on copyright law, including patents
in this study provides us another benefit. We can consider and eliminate
patent as an alternate causal story. Critics could argue industry perhaps
gains more from patents, and hence, the lack of copyright royalties or
effect may be misleading.34 Thus, I avert the incomplete analysis
objection that critics have leveled against other industry studies in the
past.35 The Indian commercial industry indicia reveal that it places
limited or no reliance on copyrights or patents.
In addition to answering the gap in American literature, the data
from the commercial industry in India provides one more gift: it prevents
scholars from confounding causality with outcomes in emerging U.S.
studies. Leading American legal scholars are turning up information
indicating that software firms in the United States prize tacit knowledge
rather than formal IP rights. But as a second step, these studies trace
causality to other laws. Some scholars, for instance, identified causation
in remote California state laws, such as the non-enforceability of
postemployment covenants not to compete, because the industry
flourished in California’s Silicon Valley while it atrophied in
Massachusetts. India reveals near-identical geographical agglomeration
but without any differences in postemployment restrictions. The
comparative analysis thus enables us to distinguish correlation from
causation and prevents second-order errors.
Until now, scholars have turned toward “serendipity” or “historic
accident” to explain why the software industry developed where it did

34

See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1450 (pointing out Raustiala &
Sprigman’s study on the fashion industry, for instance, included copyright but
not trademark—an omission that, according to Dreyfuss, was a significant error)
(citations omitted).
35
Id.
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while it atrophied in other regions.36 Legal scholars offer a more nuanced
argument: they attribute Silicon Valley’s success to “a serendipitous
result of the historic coincidence” of a 1870s California prohibition that
made postemployment covenants unenforceable, for instance.37 In other
words, the legal infrastructure available by historic accident was the
critical differentiating factor for high technology districts.
The software industry in India provides one more gift:
illuminating contracting practice. The contracting practice that software
firms employ provides strong evidence that firms encourage transfer of
know-how within a region. Startlingly, these firms prohibit spillovers of
know-how to clients in other regions. This contracting practice however
opens the door to proceed beyond “serendipity” or “historic accident”
accounts, or beyond searching for ex post justifications in remote laws.
The data from India provides decisive evidence of the legal infrastructure
needs of software firms, which firms will by contract create if it is not a
priori available under existing law. Sorting through the web of these
contracts and a fine-grained analysis of the incentives that drive software
firms at the global and regional level are left for future work.

I. THE INTERNET CHALLENGES COPYRIGHT’S EMPIRE
Copyright and Internet technologies share a complex
transformative relationship. On the one hand, the Internet threatens to
reduce copyright to a relic of the printing press era, and on the other,
copyright liability has become the arbiter of the future of Internet
technologies.38 These technologies are now so salient that technology is
36

See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) [hereinafter
SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE] (attributing the business culture in
California which created conditions conducive for high-velocity mobility as the
reason software succeeded in California while atrophying in Massachusetts). See
generally W. Brian Arthur, ‘Silicon Valley’ Locational Clusters: When Do
Increasing Returns Imply Monopoly?, 19 MATH. SOC. SCI. 235 (1990).
37
See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 575, 611 (1999) [hereinafter Gilson, High Technology Districts]. As
Gilson demonstrates, the case law does not support the premise that the two
states in question employ different standards.
38
For a discussion on how MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) chills
innovation, see, e.g., Rob Hof, Larry Lessig: Grokster Decision Will Chill
Innovation, BUS. WK. ONLINE (June 28, 2005), http://www.businessweek.
com/techbeat/archives/2005/06/larry_lessig_gr.html; Fred von Lohmann,
Remedying Grokster, LAW.COM (July 25, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article
.jsp?id+1122023112436. See also MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005);
A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Aimster, 334
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no longer of interest to only copyright scholars.39 Indeed, Internet issues
now animate the work of scholars ranging from constitutional law
experts like Cass Sunstein40 and Jack Balkin,41 to corporations and
securities law professor Ronald Gilson,42 to polymaths Richard Epstein43
and Richard Posner.44 Today, copyright involves and impacts not only
Walt Disney but Main Street too. The range of amicus curiae briefs
submitted by people from all walks of life in Eldred illustrates the variety
of issues at stake, wide interest, and current engagement with copyright
law.45
This Part will spotlight the Internet-copyright relationship and
will proceed as follows. Part I.A will provide a brief background to the
issues in American copyright law, touching lightly upon the
constitutional provision and the conflict between Internet technology and
copyright. Part I.B will discuss another dimension of the relationship
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1 (showing how
the Internet is enabling more control).
39
See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 125 (2011); Pamela Samuelson, Should
Copyright Owners Have to Give Notice Of Their Use of Technical Protection
Measures?, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41, 42 (2007).
40
See CASS SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE,
147 (2006) (discussing Wikipedia and open software). See also CASS SUNSTEIN,
REPUBLIC 2.0 (2007) (arguing that people are increasingly deploying the Internet
to filter the information they receive. Indeed, they increasingly speak with and
listen to only like-minded opinions.).
41
See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 4.
42
See Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37. See also Ronald
Gilson, Charles Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal
and Informal Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 1377 (2010).
43
See Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations
of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2005).
44
See Richard Posner, The Future of Newspapers, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG
(June 23, 2009), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2009/06/the-future-ofnewspapers--posner.html. See also William Landes & Richard Posner,
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (U. Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper
No. 154, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=319321.
45
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 124–25 (“In the Supreme Court, the
briefs on our side were about as diverse as it gets.”) Lessig proceeds to
document historical briefs submitted by the Free Software Foundation, law
professors, libraries, archives, and economists. Id. (“But two briefs captured the
policy argument best. . . . A brief by Hal Roach Studios argued that unless the
law was struck: a whole generation of American film would disappear. The
other made the economic argument absolutely clear”). See also Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (containing amicus curiae briefs submitted by 17
economists).
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between Internet technologies and copyright—the Internet’s potential to
limit copyright’s domains. More recent scholarship focuses on this aspect
of the Internet-copyright relationship in a bid to gather proof that creative
work will be produced even without strong IP protection. Scholars draw
upon open software and other creative endeavors that are flourishing
online without strong IP protections as evidence of “IP without IP”
(Internet Scholars and Internet Projects, respectively).
However, no theory espoused so far on the basis of these noncommercial Internet Projects has been able to provide a coherent
explanation for the different types of creative endeavors flourishing
online, as shall be demonstrated in Part I.B.1. In other words, the theories
put forth thus far are so narrow and limited that, at best, they are able to
explain one or two Internet Projects. Advocates of stronger copyright
point out, moreover, programmers and software firms participate in open
software development to increase future employment prospects and
market share—hence, profit remains the incentive for writing code. Part
I.B.2 will discuss the chief flaws advocates of stronger copyright point
out in Internet Theories. Part I.B.3 will bring out the logical gap in the
criticism that advocates of stronger copyright level against Internet
Theories. Advocates of stronger copyright have incorrectly collapsed the
distinction between commerce and property while criticizing Internet
Scholars. As Lessig points out in a related context, such logical
distinctions may be theoretically relevant, but are not useful to limit such
expansions in copyright.46 Judges still require evidence of information
production that would occur even without copyright, leading to Part II,
which will in detail provide evidence of “IP without IP.” The distinction
drawn between property and monetary incentives in Part I.B.3 provides
an important benefit for the analysis that follows in Part II—in limine, a
potential logical objection to separating monetary and property
motivations is eliminated.

A. Bedrock Issues
Some of the problems in U.S. copyright law can be traced back
to its constitutional roots and its very origins. The constitutional
provision empowering Congress to legislate to protect IP—Article I,
Section 8—utilizes a paradoxical scheme: it intends to increase public
access to creative works by providing private property incentives,
creating the first source of conflict.47 Providing private power to control
46

See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 128 (discussing the difference
between a right and correct answer on the evidence needed for judges to be
willing to hold expansive copyright unconstitutional).
47
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives Congress the
power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
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content and speech creates conflicts with the First Amendment, and
becomes the second source of tension.48
Thus, there is much scholarly debate between critics of copyright
on the one hand and advocates of stronger copyright on the other. These
scholars are occupied by the inquiry “does copyright fulfill its avowed
aims?” Copyright critics may be broadly divided into two groups: (a)
those who argue that copyright does not incentivize information
production (Copyright Skeptics)49 and (b) those who support copyright
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For American history of
copyright, see LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1968). For a discussion on the utilitarian basis of copyright, see
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property & Sovereignty: Notes toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1333–38 (1996); Mark
Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.
873 (1997); ROBERT GORMAN & JANE GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 14 (2006). See also H.R. REP. No. 52-1494, at 2 (1892) (“There is
nothing said [in the Constitution’s Copyright and Patent clause] about any desire
or purpose to secure to the author or inventor his ‘natural right to his
property.’”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Although the United
States has recognized limited moral rights under Visual Artists Rights Act, such
instances are exceptions to the general rule.
48
C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
891, 892 (2002) (“The Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to provide
for copyrights. A copyright grants its holder the power to stop other people—
non-copyright holders—from saying certain things or distributing certain
messages. A legislative grant of this private power to stop speech on the basis of
its content is in overt tension with the constitutional guarantees of speech and
press freedom.”). Courts also articulate another approach: copyright law has
built-in First Amendment safeguards and does not require further First
Amendment scrutiny, which has been criticized by several legal scholars. See,
e.g., Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain, in EXPANDING
THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 267, 287 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et
al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain].
49
See, e.g., Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain, supra note 48,
at 291 (arguing that copyright has been deployed to make markets in
information goods possible. Therefore, “governments must prevent many of
their constituents from reading and speaking in ways that would be beneficial
and feasible to them. This choice, to sacrifice individual interests in using
information to further the social policy goal of making markets in information
goods, raises serious normative concerns in liberal democracies”). See generally
Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). For economic arguments
against copyright, see Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Against Intellectual
Monopoly, ECONOMICS AND GAME THEORY (Nov. 11, 2005), http://levine.
sscnet.ucla.edu/general/intellectual/against.htm. For libertarian economic
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protection as a general rule but oppose the current trend of expansions as
inimical to progress.
Copyright Skeptics draw support from historical accounts of the
European Renaissance, when unsurpassed innovation and creative works
flourished. Copyright Skeptics point out that the Renaissance was
spurred by artists who were able to copy each other’s techniques and
work, without any legal restrictions.50 However, Copyright Skeptics
argue, under the guise of ensuring progress and the greater common
good, that copyright law mainly protects the incomes and wealth of
copyright holders.
In contrast to Copyright Skeptics, expansion critics believe
copyright protection incentivizes creative expression as a general rule.
However, these critics oppose the current trend of expansion as not
conducive to progress and divorced from the original constitutional
mandate.51 The expansion critics at this juncture part company with the
traditional law and economics scholars who prescribe full protection of

arguments, see STEPHAN KINSELLA, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2008),
available at http://mises.org/books/against.pdf. For a simple overview of
copyright critics’ landscape, especially in America, see Philosophy of Copyright,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_copyright (last visited
Feb. 11, 2011). Note that several groups ranging from traditional anarchists like
Leo Tolstoy to economists to libertarians have been arguing against copyright.
See generally Anti-Copyright, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anticopyright (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
50
See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 44 (arguing the history of the
content industry in the United States is a history of piracy). See also JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 11–14, 15–19 (2001) (arguing that American
ideas of freedom are linked to free information policy and laying out the basics
of U.S. copyright); Salil K. Mehra, Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law
Explain Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports? 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 155 (2002); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397
(1990) (arguing against expansions in IP because it has become a “if value then
right” principle, albeit in the context of trademarks); Anti-Copyright Definition,
WORDIQ.COM, http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Anti-copyright (last visited
Jan. 12, 2011).
51
Benkler, A Political Economy of the Public Domain, supra note 48. See, e.g.,
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 78 (“I doubt whether the framers would
recognize the regulation we call ‘copyright’ today. The scope of that regulation
is far beyond anything they ever considered.”). See also id. at 128 for Justice
O’Connor’s question to Lessig in oral hearings for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003) (“She was quite willing to concede that ‘this flies directly in the face
of what the framers had in mind.’”).
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IP.52 Expansion critics are opposed to further increases in copyright
protection, such as additions in subject matter, scope, and term or
duration.53
Advocates of stronger copyright argue that the changes merely
ensure prior rights are not whittled away by the new technologies.54 They
have argued that they are merely looking to preserve the traditional
balance of rights, permissions, and prohibitions,55 but this argument is
raised less frequently now. Even ardent advocates of stronger copyright
concede copyright’s empire has been expanded by these cumulative

52

See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1 (2004).
53
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L.J.
1783, 1792–99 (2002) (arguing the original copyright “law was slight, as was
the actual scope of protection.” Lessig further argues, “[t]his tiny regulation of a
tiny proportion of the extraordinary range of creative work in 1790 has morphed
into this massive regulation of everyone who has any connection to the most
trivial of creative authorship.” Lessig points out the rights have been increased
to include derivative works, translations, and the subject matter covered now
includes music, performances, software, and Internet works. The protected term
has also been increased from the initial term of fourteen years to the author’s life
plus seventy.). As discussed earlier, term extensions were challenged in Eldred,
537 U.S. at 186.
54
For arguments involving the DMCA, see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal
Protection of Technological Measures Protecting Works of Authorship:
International Obligations and the US Experience, NELLCO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY (Aug. 2005), http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia_pllt/0593 (“As many
commentators and other authorities have recognized, in the digital environment,
the ease of copying may render legal protection simpliciter inadequate. In the
past, copying technology was too rudimentary, cumbersome or expensive to
enable users to copy and redisseminate on the scale that digital media make
possible. Copyright law’s prohibitions thus generally sufficed, because rights
holders could enforce the law against the commercial intermediaries who
engaged in large scale copying and dissemination while whatever copying end
users engaged in was unlikely to rival the copyright owner’s control of markets
for the work. When digital media changed the technological balance, they also
altered legal relationships, for now economically significant infringing acts were
no longer the sole province of entities higher up the distribution chain. To
redress this shift, it might be necessary to reinforce the legal prohibition with a
layer of technical protection, disabling end users from availing themselves of
some of the copying technology’s potential for reproducing or redistributing
copyrighted works.”). See also Senator Orrin Hatch, Introduction of the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1997, COPYRIGHTEXTENSION.COM (Mar.
1997), http://www.copyrightextension.com/page04.html (arguing that copyright
term extensions are needed because life expectancy has changed).
55
See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 54.
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changes in law.56 However, they defend the expansions on other
grounds.57 But as Copyright Skeptics and critics of expansion argue,
expansive copyright and the cumulative effects of such increases in
property rights are deeply worrying.58
A vast majority of legal scholars are now concerned about the
impact copyright law will have on new technology and fear that
extending—to the Internet—a law that was intended to tackle the
printing press has put free speech values and innovation at risk. Peter
Menell and David Nimmer,59 for instance, recognized that on the one
hand, the indirect copyright liability standard (derived by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
from patent law and reasserted in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.) created “a safe harbor for distributors of dual-use
technologies.”60 On the other hand, the subsequent developments have all
headed in the opposite direction.61 Mennell and Nimmer argue that Sony
created a safe harbor for distributors of dual-use technologies “[b]ecause
56

See e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 52.
Id.
58
For discussion on copyright expansions in rights or scope, subject matter and
duration, see Lessig, supra note 53. Moreover, copyright has also been
expanded through broader considerations on what constitutes infringement.
These include: (a) the new standard in MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005),
which departed from the prior standard laid down in Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and had resulted in a chilling of new
technologies; (b) the reversal of the tradition of fair use; and (c) permissible
imitation, which is essential for creation. See e.g., James Boyle, Fencing Off
Ideas: Enclosure and the Disappearance of the Public Domain, in CODE:
COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, 235, 243 (Rishab
Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005) (discussing how the recent standards have whittled
down permissible fair-use); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves it, 114 YALE L.J. 535,
555 (2004) (arguing imitation is necessary for creativity by stating that “fair use
has become such a thin reed on which to rest claims that copyright does not
threaten freedom of expression”); Jane C. Ginsburg, US Initiatives to Protect
Works of Low Authorship, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF INNOVATION POLICY
55 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the expansion of copyright
to now include works of low authorship).
59
Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect
Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise,
55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007).
60
Id. at 143 (citations omitted). Dual-use technologies are technologies that can
be deployed for infringing and non-infringing uses.
61
Id. (“Yet, when one looks to cases decided since Sony, subsequent legislative
enactments, and post-Sony decisions of technology companies in the
marketplace, a different reality emerges.”).
57
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it immunized from contributory liability not only the makers of the
proto-VCR involved in that case (Sony’s Betamax), but also
manufacturers of any technology that is “merely . . . capable of
substantial noninfringing use.” This safe harbor became the central
organizing force for “product innovation” and the “technology age.”62
Yet, Menell and Nimmer argue that “legal realism” exposes a very
different “practical reality.”63
With but one exception (itself effectively overruled by later
amendment), no reported decision has found the Sony safe harbor to
immunize a technology company accused of indirect liability. In
fact, the developers and distributors of Napster, Aimster, Grokster,
Morpheus, and KaZaA—peer-to-peer systems that have
noninfringing uses—have all been held liable for contributory
infringement, Sony notwithstanding. Nor has the U.S. Congress
adhered to Sony; instead, its amendments [passed] since that case
was handed down have expanded copyright liability to reach
technologies that are capable of dual use. Technology companies
(such as YouTube, BitTorrent, TiVo, and ReplayTV) behave as
though they bear responsibility for system designs that create an
unreasonable risk of copyright infringement by users of their
technology.64

In short, copyright owners, such as large publishing houses and
film studios, require a “no-leaks guarantee” as Internet technologies
develop.65 Lessig provides a live example, from the District Court’s
proceedings in Napster, of judges requesting a “no-leaks guarantee,” or
“zero tolerance” as he calls it.66
When Napster told the district court that it had developed a
technology to block the transfer of 99.4 percent of identified
infringing material, the district court told counsel for Napster 99.4
percent was not good enough. Napster had to push the
infringements “down to zero.” If 99.4 percent is not good enough,
then this is a war on file-sharing technologies, not a war on
copyright infringement.67

62

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
64
Id. at 145 (citations omitted).
65
For similar argument, “zero tolerance,” and how this was historically not
American “culture,” see LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 53–54, 101.
66
Id.
67
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 53–54 (emphasis added) (“There is
no way to assure that a p2p system is used 100 percent of the time in compliance
with the law, any more than there is a way to assure that 100 percent of VCRs or
100 percent of Xerox machines or 100 percent of handguns are used in
63
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The no-leaks guarantee has been transformed into a sword,
extending monopolies far beyond the privilege initially contemplated.
The Internet vastly enhances the exercise of free speech rights68 and, in
the process, may also be used to create an infringing copy. The question
is whether it is appropriate to prohibit the use of an entire technology to
ensure there is no leak in the property basket. Hence, even arguendo, if
we accept the current demand is only to extend to the Internet the basket
of rights available under traditional media,69 it is effectively a demand to
prohibit technology. Another concern is that copyright was intended to
prevent counterfeiters from denying authors the profits from identical
prints (enabled by printing press), and not to provide a monopoly in
adjacent goods or to curb emerging technologies.70 In that light, is it
appropriate for a law created in response to problems arising from
printing press technology to now be deployed to chill new technologies?
In sum, critics of copyright expansion and Copyright Skeptics
worry that, with liability now attached to technology, many noninfringing uses will be lost. Expansion critics worry about the
consequences of this unequal trade-off; substantive rights may be
disproportionately sacrificed to protect against a potential leak in the
property basket.
Loss of substantive rights and non-infringing uses is one aspect
of the tension between the Internet and copyright. Another aspect of the
Internet-copyright conflict is made latent by more recent scholarship.
Scholars draw on open software (and other Internet Projects that are
flourishing without strong IP protection) to gather evidence of innovation
and creative work that will flourish even without copyright. In other
words, these studies intend to place limits on copyright expansions. Part

compliance with the law. Zero tolerance means zero p2p. The court’s ruling
means that we as a society must lose the benefits of p2p, even for the totally
legal and beneficial uses they serve, simply to assure that there are zero
copyright infringements caused by p2p.”). See id. at 164 n.17 for details of
transcript of proceedings.
68
For claims of advocates of stronger copyright, see supra p. 45–46.
69
See, e.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); A&M Records v. Napster,
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). Lessig argues the rule laid down in the two
aforementioned cases differs from the rule in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note
1 (arguing that, in Sony-Betamax, we made the decision to allow VCR sales
even though by allowing sale of recording technology, we would have
potentially enabled the creation of some infringing copies). For detailed
discussion, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
70
Aarthi S. Anand, Copyright Challenges in the Digital Era, HINDU (Dec. 29,
2008), http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/29/stories/2008122955250800.htm.
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I.B will analyze this aspect, the use of Internet Projects, and associated
experience to establish boundaries for copyright’s empire.

B. Internet Theories Attempt to Limit Copyright
Recent legal scholarship focuses on creative endeavors
flourishing online without strong IP protection. Internet Scholars are
studying and mining Internet Projects to uncover evidence of “IP without
IP” that judges seek in order to limit copyright’s expanding empire. If the
Internet Scholars had succeeded, they would have shifted the burden of
proof to advocates of stronger copyright to prove the need for increases
in IP protection. Though this Article focuses on software, in this Part, the
important theories emanating from creative work in general (in addition
to software) will be analyzed, ensuring completeness and fuller treatment
of the existing literature.
Internet Scholars have based their theories on various open
software and other creative online endeavors. But in relying on such
theories to place limits on copyright, these scholars have been drawn into
two cardinal errors. The first error is as follows. Internet Scholars
attempt to craft a general “theory” on the basis of studying one or two
Internet Projects. The “theory” is then applied to that one (or two)
Internet Project(s), but is unable to explain other equally sharp examples
of creative work flourishing online without strong IP protection. The
second error springs from the requirement of altruistic motivation.
Internet Scholars have also been drawn into establishing that software
programmers are motivated by altruism, which advocates of stronger
copyright counter easily. Advocates of stronger copyright argue such
instances are exceptions and unique cults, while proprietary software is
the norm. Advocates of stronger copyright point out, moreover,
programmers and software firms participate in open software to increase
future employment prospects and market share—hence, profit remains
the incentive for writing code. This Part will flesh out this landscape in
detail and will proceed as follows. Part I.B.1 will discuss the various
Internet Theories espoused, and point out the intrinsic limitations of
each. Part I.B.2 will demonstrate the extrinsic defects in Internet
Theories that advocates of stronger copyright point toward, and which
Internet Scholars are unable to overcome. Part I.B.3 will lightly touch
upon the logical gap in the criticism that advocates of stronger copyright
level against Internet Theories. Advocates of stronger copyright have
incorrectly collapsed the distinction between commerce or monetary
motivation on the one hand, and property on the other. This distinction
establishes there is no logical barrier to the central thesis in the Article—
that software and information products will not cease to be produced if
more property rights were not granted.
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1. Many “Whys,” Yet No Theory
This Part will study the current efforts and the barriers that
Internet Theories face and have to overcome in order to place limits on
copyright law. All the Internet Theories drawn on so far from the noncommercial sector fail to overcome the intuition that property rights
encourage production. The first barrier that Internet Scholars face is
establishing that the Internet is so unique and different from the real (or
brick-and-mortar) world that monetary gains would discourage, or are a
non-incentive for, production. In order to do so, Internet Scholars are
compelled to take either of the following tacks: (a) the Internet has
unique characteristics such that non-commercial motivations fuel
creative expression, or (b) there is some parallel with an obscure
phenomenon in the brick-and-mortar world.
Risabh Ghosh, for instance, takes the former approach and
characterizes this special feature of the cyberspace environment as “nonmonetary economics” of the “cooking-pot model,” “where access to a
vast collection of diverse resources—people, goods, or information—is
more valuable to people participating in this system than the cost of their
own work.”71 Steven Weber champions a related theory, focusing on
“antirivalness,” another feature of open source projects.72 Weber defines
“antirivalness” as the “positive network externalities” that operating
systems like Linux and software in general gain.73 Software is
characterized by “antirivalness”: the value that a user derives from any
part of the software program increases when a greater number of people
use it. Gains stem from compatibility, easier communication, and sharing
advantages.74 Weber argues that open source software brings down the
cost of maintenance and debugging (typically a large percentage of the
total cost for software).75 Weber argues Ghosh’s cooking-pots analogy
71

Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Cooking-Pot Markets and Balanced Value Flows, in
CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 153, 153–54
(Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005).
72
WEBER, OPEN SOURCE, supra note 3, at 153–54. See id. at 131 (advising “to
steer clear of altruism as a principal explanation” and side-stepping this in favor
of focusing “more cleanly on what mix of individual motivations are at play.”).
Weber also opts out of the uniqueness of the Internet plank. See id. at 13
(arguing that multiple motivations exists within the open source community and
“none of them is unique to that community or distinctive to the Information
Age.”).
73
Id. at 154.
74
Id.
75
Id. Lessig also raises a similar argument (and somewhat less persuasively) that
Microsoft, for instance, would benefit from piracy in China. (“Over time, as the
nation grows more wealthy . . . people will buy software rather than steal it.”
Whereas if Chinese used only free GNU/Linux now then, they would not be
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imposes the additional requirement that the products be traded (to assess
value); antirivalness, however, has no such additional requirement.
Avoiding this condition is important because components of Internet
Projects (e.g., Wikipedia) often do not involve any trading. This
antirivalness approach has one more advantage—it averts the problem of
proving altruistic motivation, which impedes the other theories that will
be discussed in detail below.
However, Ghosh’s and Weber’s theories suffer from a common
defect. While arguing for the uniqueness of the Internet, the antirivalness
and cooking-pot theories fail to explain the co-existence of two opposite
phenomena—programmers sometimes opt for property regimes and, at
the same time, also provide code for “free.”76 In other words, the
uniqueness of the Internet argument requires us to believe the following
contradiction. People will produce creative work in the brick-and-mortar
world in order to gain property title, yet the Internet is so unique that the
same people will not desire property rights for identical work on the
Internet.77
A second problem with the Internet Theories advanced so far is
they are too narrow and limited in scope. Internet Theories are unable to
scale up and explain other online collaborations, as shall be demonstrated
below. One group of labor theorists argues traditional labor incentives
motivate Internet Projects. Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, for instance,
exemplify the labor approach and (on the basis of observations of
Apache HTTP78 and open source email programs79) argue software
buying Microsoft products even in future, resulting in net loss for Microsoft.).
See LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 49.
76
WEBER, OPEN SOURCE, supra note 3.
77
See infra Part II.B.2 for a fuller treatment of this fatal objection that advocates
of stronger copyright put forth.
78
The Apache HTTP Server is open source software, developed and maintained
by an open community of developers and was the first viable alternative to the
Netscape Communications Corporation web server (currently known as Oracle
iPlanet Web Server). Apache not only played a key role in the initial growth of
the World Wide Web, but is also the most popular HTTP server software in use.
Apache is estimated to serve 63 percent of all websites, 66 percent of the million
busiest as per May 2011 estimates. In 2009, it became the first web server
software to surpass the 100 million website milestone. Apache HTTP Server,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apache_HTTP_Server (last visited
June 17, 2011). See also WEBER, OPEN SOURCE, supra note 3, at 6 (describing
open source projects. There were thousands ranging from small utilities to office
suites, and operating systems of which Linux and Apache are most well known.
“Apache simply dominates the web server market—over 65 percent of all active
web sites use Apache. Nearly 40 percent of large American companies use
Linux in some form; Linux is the operating system for more than a third of
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programmers participate in Internet Projects because of traditional labor
benefits (such as immediate benefits, delayed rewards, career concerns,
and ego gratification), rather than altruism.80 Another group, specifically
“migration theorists” (e.g., David Lancashire), argues developers
embraced Open Software in order to shift to a higher wage level and “tap
lucrative contracts abroad.”81 Thus, both groups of labor theorists select
one project (from a host of non-commercial Internet Projects) to put forth
a theory. Both of these theories explain one activity but fail to explain
other online collaborations, such as Wikipedia or Project Gutenberg,
which do not provide these labor benefits.82
active web servers and holds almost 14 percent of the large server market
overall.” (citation omitted)).
79
Perlmail, Sendmail, and others are open source email transfer and
management programs, and Sendmail powers about 80 percent of the world’s
mail servers. See also WEBER, OPEN SOURCE, supra note 3 (for some examples
of how we all use and are the recipients of open source—a Google search uses
Linux and Yahoo! Directory service is on FreeBSD, another open source
initiative. Similarly, Linux was used to develop the special effects for Titanic,
Lord of the Rings, and other films.).
80
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J.
INDUS. ECON. 197, 200, 212–13 (2002) (arguing that, on the basis of Apache,
Perl, and Sendmail, traditional labor incentives motivate Internet Projects.
Lerner & Tirole argue that a combination of immediate benefits, delayed
rewards through career concern (including future jobs, share in commercial open
source based companies, future access to venture capital markets), and ego
gratification incentives (including peer recognition) rather than altruism is the
reason open source has succeeded.).
81
David Lancashire, Code, Culture and Cash: The Fading Altruism of Open
Source Development, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 3, 2001), http://firstmonday.org
/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/904. David Lancashire, on the
basis of Open Software, argues for the Mayflower (or historical migration)
effect of labor rather than for altruism. Lancashire contends, “[i]n a global
economy lacking perfect labor mobility and characterized by wage-inequality
across countries, we expect individuals to produce free software if doing so can
shift them to a higher wage-level. This ‘fixed cost analysis’ implies (as Lerner &
Tirole suggest in their paper) that developers may embrace Open Source work as
a way to tap lucrative corporate networks abroad.” Id.
82
See, e.g., Lerner & Tirole, supra note 80. But neither career concern nor ego
gratification can explain Wikipedia or Project Gutenberg, which are hugely
successful collaborative projects. Further, Lerner & Tirole argue (a) the Internet
is not distinctive but merely changes the scale of production and expands
formalization, and rely on (b) “the long tradition of sharing and cooperation in
software development.” Id. By pointing to the large number of proprietary
software, advocates of stronger copyright can easily disprove this contention
that Lerner & Tirole raise. Lancashire’s migration labor theory also fails to
explain Wikipedia, Project Gutenberg, and other Internet Projects, which do not
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A second subset of Internet Scholars argues that hacker ethics or
altruism motivates the online projects (Hacker Ethicists). Hacker
Ethicists argue these altruistic motivations have expanded beyond
software and into other activities on the Internet. By arguing for altruism,
this group boxes itself into a tight corner. Hacker Ethicists assume the
burden of proving: (a) programmers and other Internet Project
participants are devoid of non-altruistic motivations, and (b) the
conditions that are necessary for altruistic projects to take root exist.83
Hacker Ethicists run the risk of espousing too narrow a theory and fall
into the “cult” trap to which advocates of stronger copyright have already
alluded.
A third group, “commons theorists,” argues from the perspective
of the larger movement toward the public domain or digital commons.84
According to the commons theorists, open source is just one instance of
this larger movement. The commons theorists have a key advantage—
they do not have to establish motivations unique to hackers, a
requirement that trips up other theorists such as the Hacker Ethicists
discussed earlier. The commons theorists instead call for an expansive
study that includes collaborations from the brick-and-mortar world.
provide any networking or allied career benefits for collaborators. See
Lancashire, supra note 81.
83
See, e.g., Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux
and Open Source by an Accidental Revolutionary 65–113 (2001), available at
http://catb.org/~esr/writings/homesteading/cathedral-bazaar/. Eric Raymond
explains hacker culture as a sociological phenomenon. This geographicalsociological approach however fails to explain the co-existence of software
prompted by both motivations: open software and software protected by IP
rights or proprietary software. Raymond argues that hacker culture has
developed into a specific type of gift-culture involving history and values. He
allows for multiple varieties of hacker ideology leading up to a puritan practice,
and explains the significance of peer repute (prestige) in every gift culture and
idealized the sublimation of ego. This theory however fails to explain why this
sublimation occurs only amongst hackers. Why did this Europa-American
attitude to the sublimation of the ego not prevail in other industries and only
emerges in Open Software? He could argue the peculiarity of the open-source
culture, and the complexity of artifacts produced means the value of these
artifacts is not as obvious as in an exchange economy. Even, if arguendo, we
accept that skilled professionals are unable to assess the potential value of their
contribution, alternative measurements like opportunity cost negate this already
thin “inability to assess” argument. In other words, the objection remains—this
theory cannot explain why do people collaborate on open software but not in
any other industry.
84
Boyle, supra note 58, at 246; Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free
Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY (Aug. 2, 1999),
http://www.blagblagblag.org/anarchism/index.html.
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Once the commons theorists argue for a more expansive study,
next, they determine the conditions necessary for collaborative
production (on the basis of the aforementioned broader study of
collaborative behavior). The commons theorists argue for the coexistence of both spheres—collaborative and commercial activity in the
digital world—rather than arguing that peer-based mechanisms will
replace the market. Even though the commons theorists successfully
avoid the barriers confronted by others, their theory is inadequate. In
refraining from constructing a positive theory or explanation, this group
fails to fulfill the main purpose of studying such collaborative projects:
to provide a coherent theory to limit copyright’s expanding empire. In
other words, the commons theory fails to provide any justification or
basis to limit further expansions in copyright.
For instance, Yochai Benkler, who endorses the commons
approach, expands the study beyond open software to include other
collaborative activities on the Internet (such as book digitization projects
and Internet encyclopedias).85 This expansive study is a useful first step
but stops short of providing a bright-line rule to identify when
collaboration is a better incentive than property rights.86 In other words,
Benkler’s argument falters at the step of providing the law with a
positive covenant or the guidance to determine when copyright ought to
be reined in to enable commons-based information production.87

85

Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
YALE L.J. 369 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Penguin]. Benkler
expanded the study to include other collaborative activities on the Internet,
including book digitization projects, Internet encyclopedias, relevance and
accreditation for search engines, etc. See id. at 384, 392, 398. For Benkler’s
arguments on parallels in the brick-and-mortar world, such as car-pooling and
others, see Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J.
273, 281 (2004). For a discussion on Open Software, see Boyle, supra note 58,
at 371 (“The emergence of free software and the phenomenal success of its
flagships—the GNU/Linux operating system, the Apache web server, Perl,
Sendmail, BIND and many other projects—should force us to take a second
look at the ‘dominant paradigm’ of markets.”).
86
Because Benkler’s study includes multiple projects, it has the advantage of
scaling from free software to a general principle. Benkler argues peer-based
production corrects the inefficiencies in private property motivations and strong
IP rights would raise the cost of access. Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note
85, at 445. Benkler also recognized the significance of peer-based production
models, and additionally, the features of modularity and granularity that were
common to various collaborative efforts on the Internet. Id. at 380, 433.
87
Benkler’s argument can, at the most, be interpreted as providing a negative
covenant. Id. at 446 (“That we cannot fully understand a phenomenon does not
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Similarly, another commons theorist, James Boyle, draws
parallels with trends toward commons in science, law, and other arenas.88
Boyle’s theory also fails to provide a reasoned justification to limit
property expansion on the Internet. Like Benkler, Boyle identifies modes
of nonproprietary intellectual production that flourish alongside the
proprietary regime.89 John Clippinger and David Bollier also point to the
trends toward donation to the public domain in evolutionary science and
other fields.90 But Boyle, as well as Clippinger and Bollier, fails to
indicate when lawmakers and government regulators ought to refrain
from expanding property rights.
Another potential argument stems from the context of the
Internet and free speech, though it may not have been articulated as yet
in the context of software. First Amendment scholar Jack Balkin argues
that explaining the limited role of property rights in the Internet age
requires only an understanding of the salience of Internet technologies
and their impact on innovation rather than on novelty.91 Jack Balkin
mean that it does not exist.”). I agree with Benkler and others that a more
detailed study of peer production is required. But the problem is that expansion
critics rely upon Internet Projects to limit property law expansions, and yet they
have not been able to identify when collaboration is a better incentive than
property rights. This theory thus remains incomplete and does not provide for a
justification to limit copyright expansions.
88
Boyle relies upon the characteristics that Benkler identified—namely,
modularity and granularity. On that basis, Boyle draws parallels with similar
activity in the spheres of science, law, education, and music. Boyle, supra note
58, at 235, 245; see also Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, supra note 85.
89
Boyle’s response to the issue (whether the limited example of the open
software movement allows for generalization) relied entirely upon the hunch
that the increasing migration of the sciences toward data-rich, processing-rich
models of distributed, nonproprietary intellectual production will likely increase
innovation and discovery. Boyle, supra note 58, at 246. Also, Boyle argued for a
scaled-down though still strong IP regime. Id. at 247.
90
John Clippinger & David Bollier, A Renaissance of the Commons: How the
New Sciences and Internet are Framing a New Global Identity and Order, in
CODE: COLLABORATIVE OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 259, 275
(Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005) (arguing for the Internet as one of several
examples of an emerging commons or the limits of free-market dogma, albeit
with different visibility for its social, economic, and political repercussions).
Note Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole also study commons examples. For instance,
they focus upon “user driven innovation” in other areas of technological
innovation like the machine tool and scientific instrument industries, though
they do agree that the Open Source model is distinct from these in its promise of
recognition and reward. See Lerner & Tirole, supra note 80.
91
In the context of the Internet and its impact on freedom, Jack Balkin rightly
argued the question is not whether the Internet does something new, but whether
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raised this argument in the context of free speech but it arguably can be
extended to Internet Projects. However, even this argument would not
create a coherent or persuasive case for Internet Projects to limit
copyright. This salience-not-novelty argument may be logically correct,
but fails to provide any bright-line prescription. Moreover, the saliencenot-novelty argument puts us back at square one, and the question that
was put to Lessig in Eldred.92 In other words, courts still require clear
evidence in order to limit copyright and a three-century-old presumption.
In sum, no Internet Theory so far is able to provide a coherent
explanation for the various creative endeavors ostensibly flourishing on
the Internet without IP protection. Hence, gaps persist in existing
literature.
2. Copyright’s Weapon – The Property Intuition
In addition to the intrinsic gaps in the Internet Theories upon
which Part I.B.1 elaborated, advocates of stronger copyright point out
two critical flaws in Internet Theories. First, advocates of stronger
copyright argue the opposing theories fail to overcome the barrier
presented by the intuition that property rights incentivize production. In
other words, the current theories calling for weaker copyright fail to
provide a coherent explanation for the co-existence of two opposite
motivations: the willingness to engage in expression on the Internet
without property rights, and parties seeking financial remuneration at
other times and in other spaces for identical activity. Glass aptly
elucidates this intuition (and the damaging lack of coherence in any
Internet Theory so far):
Most programmers have always liked money. It’s no accident that
salaries are sky-high, that stock options are an ever-present force, . .
. that some of the world’s wealthiest people are in software. The
connection between being good at software work and being rich is
no accident; most software people seek the money that comes with
the work. Contrast that with the fact that the open-source movement
is about making unpaid contributions to software products. . . . As if
the best, brightest, and most talented software people had no desire
to work in the traditional, play-for-pay entrepreneurial software
environment. As a member of the loyal opposition, I don’t buy that.
it makes certain aspects of social world particularly salient. This argument on
digital salience in the context of human freedoms would just as easily be
applicable to innovation. See Balkin, supra note 4, at 2–3 (“What features of the
human activity of the human condition does a technological change foreground,
emphasize or problematize? And what are the consequences for human freedom
of making this aspect more pervasive, central and important than it was
before?”).
92
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1, at 128.

92

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

[Vol. 11

I cannot imagine that the software field will experience a
groundswell change toward the maintenance, reading, and study of
software for no financial reward, away from the traditional
importance placed on development and money. . . . Any change that
does happen will be limited to one or a few cults emerging from a
niche culture of the software field. In other words, an interesting
chapter in software’s history, but hardly a ground-rules-changing
93
one.

Scholars also claim that Internet studies cannot be relied on as
evidence of “IP without IP.”94 Professor Ronald Mann, for instance,
argues open source depends upon, and is consistent with, proprietary
software (Dependence Objection).95 Rochelle Dreyfuss adds to Mann’s
empirical evidence and raises an objection that is fatal for Internet
Theories so far: the vast majority of non-IP projects are “based on a
strong norm of attribution,” and therefore rely on pre-existing IP
regimes.96 Indeed, open source and other projects depend upon financial
and other forms of support from proprietary software firms.97 Moreover,
advocates of stronger copyright argue that the Internet Scholars’ criteria
for successful Internet Projects exposes the narrow confines and limits
non-property-based projects to only a few situations,98 which may also be
93

See Glass, supra note 15 (emphasis added); see also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
THE WORLD IS FLAT 101 (2005) (“Added Bill Gates, ‘You need capitalism [to
drive innovation.] To have [a movement] that says innovation does not deserve
an economic reward is contrary to where the world is going.’”).
94
Dreyfuss, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
95
Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16, at 46.
96
Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1449 (arguing that the vast majority of software
programmers working on open source are motivated by extrinsic motivations or
labor market benefits whereby programmers participate in open source projects
to signal competence and improve employment prospects). Dreyfuss also argues
that open platforms are often enabled by direct financial support from
proprietary firms because programmers are paid salaries, which permits them to
write code for open source projects that consequently enables maintenance
services from open source services like Red Hat and others. Id. at 1451–52.
97
Id. at 1450 (“But since the segment of the market that pays for programmers is
largely supported by intellectual property rights, there is reason to question
whether, in the absence of an intellectual property regime, there would be such
strong interest in participating in open source.”).
98
For instance, Dreyfuss utilizes Benkler’s study on the features of peer
production projects (modular, granular, and large number of contributors) and
argues “many innovation opportunities are not susceptible to this type of
division or integration.” Id. at 1453. Dreyfuss also points out that while this may
be possible in software, science does not lend itself to granular modules or
continuous forward movements. Id. at 1452–54. Dreyfuss, for instance, points
out that Benkler and the other scholars studying open source ignore the high
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unstable over time.99 Ironically, Internet Scholars’ studies are used to
strengthen Glass’s “cult” objection.
Dreyfuss’s real and effective objection echoes Justice Kennedy’s
question in Eldred: where is the empirical data that proves information
production will continue unabated even without intellectual property
laws?100 Absent this evidence, it is difficult to argue for scaling back preexisting IP laws.
Advocates of stronger copyright thus effectively reply to Internet
Scholars. Advocates of stronger copyright build upon the dominant
property intuition to argue that Internet Projects are dependent on preexisting IP protections and, as a result, cannot be utilized as evidence of
“IP without IP.”101 Thus, in spite of the recent studies pertaining to open
software and other Internet Projects, the evidence judges seek in order to
limit copyright continues to elude them.
3. Gap in the Property Intuition
Internet Theories put forth so far are unable to effectively
address the property intuition because they have confused commerce
with property. Copyright scholars inquire, “Why would software
programmers work for monetary incentives but put up code for free?”
This question commences the quest to establish software programmers’
motivations. This quest to prove altruistic motivation is a logical misstep
because advocates of stronger copyright incorrectly assume “incentive”
is synonymous with “property.”

initial costs of developing strong leaders, intellectual capital, and skills. Id. at
1454. This harks back to Dreyfuss’s and Mann’s argument that open source
counts on commercial software firms to pay for these high initial costs.
99
Dreyfuss points out that there may also be a “natural ending point” to open
projects once the technology develops sufficiently. Id. at 1456. In other words,
there is greater sharing when the technology’s future is uncertain as a risk
mitigation mechanism, but “as the field clarifies and commercial applications
become better understood, the need to spread risks declines. . . . Collective
development may come to a halt as the parties involved rely increasingly on
secrecy and intellectual property rights.” Id.
100
For the Dependence Objection, see Dreyfuss, supra note 11. In addition to
objecting to open source studies as evidence of “IP without IP,” Dreyfuss also
leveled a clear objection to the previous industry-based studies. Dreyfuss
pointed out that the fashion industry-based studies omitted trademarks, which is
the key IP for the fashion industry. Therefore, Dreyfuss argued, given this
critical gap in the fashion industry studies, they were inadequate to conclude IP
is irrelevant to industry. This is the proverbial last nail in the coffin with regard
to the fashion industry-based studies. See id. at 1452.
101
Id.
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Simply stated, money and property are two different factors,
even if they are sometimes related, and separating the two factors
corrects this logical misstep.102 In the software context, monetary
incentives, or “cash-for-code,” does not automatically necessitate
property rights. This distinction between property and monetary
incentives relieves us of any need to inquire into the moral motivations
of software engineers. Suffice it to say that they write code (or other
creative work) without property rights as the primary goal.
This logical distinction may be relevant, but is not useful
because judges still require evidence of “IP without IP” in order to limit
copyright expansions. For instance, this logical distinction echoes
Lessig’s “correct but not the right” response to Justice Kennedy in
Eldred.103 In this case, during oral hearings prior to writing the majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy had asked for evidence of “IP without IP.”
Lessig responded “like a professor correcting a student,” stating the issue
at stake was a structural claim (on the limit on extensions to the
copyright term) rather than an empirical one.104 Thus, judges were
102

Although the concepts of property and money overlap, they have different
characteristics. For example, property and money are both fungible, but property
also has the characteristic of exclusion. This argument is in line with classical
economic theory as propounded by Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and James
Mill. These classical economists argued that “money is a veil” and the
fundamental focus remains on the “‘real’ exchange of goods and services as
opposed to the accumulation of financial resources.” John Smithin, Introduction
to WHAT IS MONEY? 1 (John Smithin ed., Routledge 2000). For a classic legal
exposition that is consistent with the distinction drawn in this Article, and how
money, IP, and funds differ from property, see J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 109–111 (Clarendon Press 1997). Penner, for instance, points
out money is a “different kind of property” as it is used as “currency” or
“negotiable chattel.” In other words, when one receives money, one is entitled to
the value of the currency and not legal title to the specific coins. Id. at 109
(citations omitted). See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 47–50 (Clarendon
Press 1996) (exposing the distinctions and overlaps in the concepts of money
and property). Harris (relying on F.A. Mann) points out that on the one hand,
money is a chattel that is meant to serve as “universal means of exchange.” Id. at
48. On the other hand, similar to property (and unlike chattels), money provides
the power to allocate scarce resources. “Sometimes, money is conceived of as
property as well as wealth, and sometimes as a form of wealth other than
property. As we shall see, some political philosophers have hiccoughed over just
this ambiguity.” Id. at 49. See also Thomas Merrill, Property and the Right to
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) (discussing the right to exclude as the
“sine qua non” characteristic of property, rather than just one of the most
important characteristics of property).
103
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE, supra note 1.
104
Id.

No. 1]

“LESS IS MORE”: NEW PROPERTY PARADIGM

95

seeking evidence of “IP without IP,” and the inability to provide this
material was the turning point in the decision to uphold the statute
extending the term of copyright. This search for “IP without IP” leads us
directly to the discussion in Part II: the evidence of a commercial
software industry flourishing in India without strong IP protections.
However, this logical gap is briefly discussed here for three
reasons. First, it situates and demonstrates why the Indian evidence is
even more on-point. Commercial profit is sufficient incentive for the
software industry in India, and therefore, the software firms do not seek
property rights. Comparing property to commercial incentives (as with
the Internet Theories mentioned earlier) presents a problem of comparing
apples to oranges. The commercial software industry data from India,
however, enables scholars to focus on the correct question: Are copyright
and patent protections necessary for software programmers to write
programs? On that note, a second related question arises: Would
innovation and the software industry not exist if not for copyright or
patent protection?
Mann, at the very start of his seminal study, stated that, absent
objective evidence quantifying “the benefits that the commercial
software industry derives from IP,” it is difficult to analyze the problem
of what role property rights play in open source.105 By providing
evidence of “IP without IP” from the commercial software industry in
India, this Article fills the precise gap in the literature Mann identifies.
Moreover, the evidence from the commercial industry has one more
advantage: it remains untouched by the Dependence Objection that is
fatal to earlier Internet Theories, as Mann and Dreyfuss demonstrated to
great effect.106

105

Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16, at 2.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1439 (arguing that “[t]he time is thus ripe to
consider whether and when intellectual property rights are needed”). Hence, the
Indian evidence is timely, sufficient, and not subject to the various objections
from the open source movement. For details, see supra Part I.B.2. The main
objection is that open source and other endeavors are based on attribution, which
is effectively predicated on pre-existing IP regimes. The natural experiment in
India does not run afoul of these objections: (a) the Indian software industry
does not depend on attribution either directly or indirectly because works for
hire belong to Indian employers; (b) there is no evidence that U.S. clients
provide any additional payment to Indian firms in exchange for IP rights in
software—that is, contracts are essentially to execute and perform projects, and
provide deliverables; (c) the evidence from India does not require proving that
the Internet has unique characteristics that render property rights as disincentive,
nor that software programmers are more motivated by altruism. Further, the
Indian software industry is well-developed. Hence, the objections posed by
106
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“IP WITHOUT IP”: THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN INDIA

“[I]t took us 23 years to reach the first billion dollars in revenues
while we reached the next billion in 23 months,” as famously
remarked by Nandan Nilekeni one of the founders of Infosys Ltd.,
and now a Cabinet Minister in India.107

The software industry in India provides evidence that
commercial industry is unaffected by an increase or decrease in IP
protection. The Indian industry has emerged as the fastest growing
software industry in the world in the period between 1994 and 2010. In
the same period, the government introduced copyright and patent
protections for software, providing a natural experiment and an
opportunity to double-check or verify the proposition.108
Part II.A.1 will provide data on whether a surge in the Indian
industry’s growth rate occurred when copyright or patent protection was
introduced. Parts II.A.2–4 will provide a brief background discussion of
the industry relevant to the analysis. It will describe how the software
industry is viewed as an important contributor to the national economy,
as well as India’s economic rise at the global level. As a result of the
industry’s national importance, the software industry is well regarded
and has an established industry lobby. IP royalties, however, constitute a
very small portion of the revenues that software firms earn. Part II.B
discusses some anticipated objections to the Indian data. Part II.C
analyzes the copyright and patent laws covering software to demonstrate
that IP protection is relatively weak in India. This observation, when
combined with the previous growth data, suggests the industry may
benefit from mild laws. Although this Article focuses on copyright laws,
Part II.C.2 shall analyze the extent of patent coverage for software so that
we can eliminate patents as an alternate causal story. Furthermore,
because the legislature withdrew patent protection, this Part will doublecheck whether the industry growth rate would fall if IP protection

Dreyfuss that non-IP models may be limited to early development stages and are
unstable in time can be eliminated. In other words, these factors may disappear
once the nascent industry further develops. India is aptly suited to provide the
needed evidence because it is a net exporter of software. Dreyfuss cautions that
sometimes IP laws may be increased by legislators in net-exporting countries,
like the U.S., to earn more from exports. Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1465. The
evidence from a net-exporting industry like India demonstrates that the industry
does not require such a tilt even for an export support standpoint.
107
Infosys Revenue Tops $2B; Q4 Net Rises 20.6 Pc, HINDU BUS. LINE (Apr. 15,
2006), http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2006/04/15/stories/20060415040501
00.htm.
108
See Huang, supra note 21.
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diminishes.109 It should be noted that neither individual firms nor the
industry at large protested the withdrawal of patent protection.

A. Growth Without Copyright Surge – An Overview
1. Growth Not in Step with Intellectual Property
If the traditional law and economics prescription were correct,
then the two periods during which IP protection increased would have
witnessed a surge in growth. Instead, the actual growth curve (Figure 1
below) demonstrates no such surge after the legislature introduced
copyright and patent protections. The growth rate should have risen
sharply when copyright protection for software came into effect in May
1995. In other words, the growth slope should have been steeper,
matching the counterfactual scenarios depicted in Figure 1.
Similarly, if the property-growth paradigm is true, the growth
curve should display an inverted V in the period between 2004 and 2005.
This inverted V would have illustrated (a) a surge in growth between
December 2004 and April 2005 when patent protection was provided for
software, followed by (b) an immediate, sharp decline when the
legislature rejected the amendment and withdrew patent protection. The
slope of the industry growth curve has however been unaffected by the
introduction of copyright and patent protections. Ironically, periods of
marked industry growth did not occur when IP protection was strongest
but occurred after IP protection was reduced.110 For instance, the periods
immediately after the repeal of patent protection in April 2005 and
onward (in fiscal years 2005 and 2006) saw a sharp increase in industry
growth. Sifting through this data to determine the positive causal
conditions and why the industry took root in India is left for future work.
For gathering evidence of “IP without IP,” the central purpose of this
Article, it is sufficient that an increase or decrease in IP protection
appears to have no bearing on the growth curve.
The immediate lack of surge may be explained by the fact that
insufficient time elapsed after the legal measure was introduced and
before the effect might be visible. However, given the marked industry
indifference (as will be detailed in Part II.C.2), it is difficult to believe
that an insufficient time lapse is the sole reason for the lack of a surge in
growth. Even if, arguendo, we accept the lack of surge in response to the
introduction of the patent law was because of inadequate time lapse, this
condition does not explain the lack of surge after copyright protection
was introduced. The Copyright Act was passed in April 1994 and came
into effect in 1995; industry knew at least a year in advance that software
109
110

Id.
See infra Figure 1.

98

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

[Vol. 11

would definitely be protected under the Copyright Act. Conceivably, this
knowledge enabled firms to start seeking royalties, pursue copyright
protection, and display changes in behavior and strategy, if copyright
was indeed an incentive.
A second and related objection could be that more time must
elapse after the copyright amendment to detect and measure the effect
(of the amendment).111 We can disprove this claim easily by analyzing
the software firms’ behavior. If the only reason we do not see a surge is
because of inadequate time, one can reasonably expect there would have
been a significant change in revenues from IP royalties or a firm’s
conduct a few years after the amendment. The data, however, disputes
this conclusion. The head of a top-five software firm confirms that, more
than 15 years after copyright was introduced for software, there currently
is no visible change in the industry or software firms’ behavior.112 In
other words, there was no significant change in (a) the revenues a firm
earned from IP royalties, (b) firms’ business or contracts with clients (in
order to now press copyright claims), or (c) copyright infringement
claims (or patent filings) in India or abroad. The firms’ behavior and
indifference for close to 15 years after the copyright amendment helps
eliminate the “insufficient time-lapse” objection. The lack of surge
cannot be explained merely as a timing issue, and so, we can reasonably
eliminate this set of objections to the natural experiment data.

111

I thank Scott Hemphill and the editors of this Journal for pointing out this
possibility.
112
Interview with member of senior management of a top-five software firm in
India, in N.Y., N.Y. (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Interview with Management].
Note that the senior management officer preferred to be anonymous as some of
the information shared is confidential financial data related to the business of the
firm.
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FIGURE 1: Software Industry Growth in India113
1994 – 2011

113

The data relied upon to plot industry growth are from NASSCOM studies. As
the top software industry body in India, NASSCOM is the best source of data.
Due to variation in defining software and information technology, studies have
produced different estimates of industry growth. Utilizing NASSCOM studies
provides the advantage of consistency and uniform standards. Other studies
would require using a patchwork of multiple sources to cover the requisite years,
thereby increasing errors (stemming from calculations based on different
definitions of software and IT). Note that I use NASSCOM’s total industry
revenues (software and hardware) to prevent statistical and methodological
errors stemming from changing definitions or notions of what constitutes
services, software, etc. in the industry. This also does not detract from the
analysis in this Article as software constitutes a vast majority of the annual
revenues. To verify the analysis and for a detailed breakdown, see the sources
listed below. The sources of each year’s estimates obtained and plotted in Figure
1 are as follows.
a.
1994–95 – Indian IT Industry – A Success Story, NASSCOM,
http://www.nasscom.in/download/IndianITIndustry.doc (last visited June 2,
2011).
b.
1995–96 – INDIAN EMBASSY, http://www.indianembassy.org/indianinfo
/india_it.htm (last visited June 2, 2011) (quoting NASSCOM).
c.
1996–2001 – Indian Software Export grows by 65% in 2000–01,
NASSCOM, http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=
2640 (last updated July 12, 2006).
d.
2001–02 – Indian Software and Services Exports, NASSCOM, http://www.
nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=2635 (last updated July
12, 2006).
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The Indian data shows growth is unrelated to an increase (or a
decrease) in IP protection. The following subsection will elaborate on the
industry’s continued display of robust growth and its rising contribution
to the economy.
2. Growth Story – Extent and Depth
The software industry in India substantially contributed to the
national economy and India’s economic ascendance at the international
level. By 2010, software had grown into a $76 billion industry in India,
and Indian firms have emerged as strong players in the international
market.114 Indian software firms account for $71.7 billion, or nearly fifty
percent, of the $1.6 trillion worldwide industry.115 Nor is the growth
likely to stop soon—India’s top two software firms (Tata Consultancy
Services Ltd. and Infosys Technologies Ltd.) grew 20 percent in 2010,

2002–03, 2003–04, 2004–05 – Indian software and services exports exceed
expectations, NASSCOM (June 2, 2005), http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/
templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=2638. Note that latest 2002–03 estimates were
taken from this recent statement rather than from the older 2002–03 initial
estimates provided in the earlier 2001–02 page. This choice does not impact the
argument made in this Article, and later estimates were used for better accuracy.
f.
2005–06 – Indian IT Software And Services Grow By 31.4% in FY 05–06,
NASSCOM, http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=2
8833 (last updated Oct. 17, 2006).
g.
2006–07 – Indian IT Software and Services Revenues, NASSCOM,
http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=51734
(last
updated July 3, 2007).
h.
2007–08 – Nasscom Releases FY08 Revenue Performance and FY09
Forecast, NASSCOM, http://nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?
id=54255 (last updated July 15, 2008).
i.
2008–09 – Nasscom Releases Indian IT Software and Services – FY09
Performance and Future Trends, NASSCOM, http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/
templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=55739 (last updated Feb. 4, 2009).
j.
2009–10 – Indian IT – BPO Industry Exports Touches USD 50 Billion
Landmark, NASSCOM, http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPag
e.aspx?id=58639 (last updated Feb. 4, 2010).
114
Note this study’s estimate has combined the software, hardware, and business
process outsourcing industry, and the latter’s inclusion in no way detracts from
the robustness of the analysis in this article. See NASSCOM, THE IT BPO
SECTOR IN INDIA: STRATEGIC REVIEW – 2011, http://www.nasscom.in/sites/
default/files/researchreports/ExecSummary_0.pdf [hereinafter IT BPO SECTOR
IN INDIA] (indicating the industry has grown in the last two decades from a base
of $150 million in 1991–92).
115
See NASSCOM, INDIAN IT-BPO INDUSTRY 2009, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/54953143/IT-Industry-Factsheet-Mar-2009
(last
updated Feb. 2009).
e.
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while other firms in the global top 10 grew only at a rate of 5.8
percent.116
With a compound annual growth rate exceeding 50 percent, the
software industry has been the fastest growing sector in India for over a
decade and contributes to a significant portion of the national GDP.117
The software industry contributes handsomely to the national foreign
exchange earnings too—an estimated $47 billion in 2009—which is
unlikely to decline in the near future.118
Public perception also favors the industry because it is
commonly recognized that the software industry greatly propelled the
Indian economy. The public also credits the software industry for
transforming India’s image at the global level. As discussed earlier, India
has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies worldwide, posting
a healthy growth rate of 8.4 percent in 2005–2006. It actually surpassed
China’s growth rate by 0.1 percent in 2010, according to the IMF’s
World Economic Outlook.119

116

Sridhar K. Chari, Indian IT firms Outpace Global Rivals in Growth,
LIVEMINT (May 13, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.livemint.com/2011/05
/12204421/Indian-IT-firms-outpace-global.html?atype=tp (quoting Gartner
Inc.’s figures).
117
DUN & BRADSTREET REPORT, supra note 24. For instance, the software
industry contributed over 6.1 percent of the GDP in 2010.
118
In fifteen years, software exports have increased substantially—from $734
million in 1995–96, to $4 billion in 1999–2000, to $47 billion in 2009. See IT
Industry Factsheet, NASSCOM, http://www.scribd.com/doc/54953143/ITIndustry-Factsheet-Mar-2009 (last visited Dec. 18, 2011). India is set to be the
leading software exporter in FY12, increasing its IT export revenues to $68–70
billion (an increase of 16–18 percent from FY11). India’s Software Exports Seen
up 16–18pct in FY12, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2011, 7:31 AM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2011/02/02/india-outsourcing-outlook-idUSSGE71106L201
10202 (quoting NASSCOM’s revenue forecast); India’s Software Exports Seen
Up 16–18% in FY12, DAILY FT (Feb. 7, 2011, 2:36 AM),
http://www.ft.lk/2011/02/07/india’s-software-exports-seen-up-16-18-in-fy12/
(quoting the same revenue forecast from NASSCOM). See generally Jason
Dedrick & Kenneth L. Kraemer, Information Technology in India: The Quest
for Self Reliance, 33 ASIAN SURV. 463 (1993). Incidentally, the Indian
experience also addresses Dreyfuss’s concern that policy reasons may motivate
net exporter countries to increase IP products and exports to improve their
balance of payment. See Dreyfuss, supra note 11.
119
See sources cited supra note 25.
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3. Industry Influence – Extent and Depth
The software industry has an effective and strong lobby at the
individual firm level and through its industry lobbying group, the
National Association of Software and Service Companies
(NASSCOM).120 Through statements to the press, Indian software firms
express displeasure when India, the United States, or any other country
promulgates laws and regulations that adversely impact them.121 For
instance, Indian entrepreneurs based in Silicon Valley interact with
governments to influence policies.122 However, the software firms are
silent with regard to IP protection in particular and do not endorse its
increase.123

120

NASSCOM is the top industry body representing the Indian software firms.
95% of the Indian software firms are members. About NASSCOM, NASSCOM,
http://www.nasscom.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=5365.
121
E.g., NASSCOM President Som Mittal stated that the new U.S. visa fees hike
proposed by U.S. Senator Charles Schumer was reduced from several years to
one year based on India’s coaxing. See Shefali Anand, U.S. Visa Fees Extension
Could Have Been Worse, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2010, 3:53 PM), http://blogs.wsj
.com/indiarealtime/2010/12/24/us-visa-fee-extension-could-have-been-worse;
See Tripti Lahiri, New Visa Fees ‘Likely’ Violate Trade Rules, Study Finds,
WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 10, 2010, 3:49 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/indiare
altime/2011/01/10/new-visa-fees-likely-violate-trade-rules-study-finds (quoting
NASSCOM’s comment on the high visa fees increasing costs to Indian
technology firms by $250 million); Obama Signs Border Security Bill Despite
Protests by Indian IT Cos., ECON. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2010), http://econ
omictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/services/travel/visa-power
/Obama-signs-border-security-bill-despite-protests-by-Indian-IT-cos/articleshow
/6308238.cms. To what extent this statement of the Indian firms’ influence is
true or not is irrelevant for the purpose of this Article. I rely on these statements
to make the more modest point that Indian software firms do comment in public
and in print, and lobby with governments in both India and in the United States
when adversely impacted. See also Global Trade Development, NASSCOM,
http://www.nasscom.org/initiatives/global-trade-development (last visited Feb.
1, 2012).
122
For an example of Indian entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley’s connections with
government and influencing policy, see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, THE NEW
ARGONAUTS 310 (2006). Saxenian recounts that Silicon Valley entrepreneur
Kanwal Rekhi successfully lobbied for telecom reform in India and Silicon
Valley entrepreneurs (including Indians) who spearheaded venture capital
investment in India, even heading the Securities Exchange Board of India’s
Committee on Venture Capital.
123
There is also no mention of IP laws in various studies documenting the
several legal and regulatory interventions that facilitated the software industry.
See, e.g., Balaji Parathasarathy, Globalizing Information Technology: The
Domestic Policy Context for India’s Software Production and Exports, 3
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The Indian software industry displays an apathy and complete
disinterest in securing software under the property rubric. NASSCOM
undertakes many activities such as promoting “Brand India” in software
and leading various forums and initiatives in order to support industry. In
sharp contrast, NASSCOM is silent on IP (or the need for any increase in
IP laws).124 NASSCOM and Indian software firms are not seeking IP
protection, and yet it is arguably vital for industry growth.125
4. Bottom-line Untouched by Intellectual Property
As a senior member of the management at a top-five Indian
software firm explained, “[O]n an average, we earn 30–60 percent
EBITDA [or Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and
Amortization] for executing any project and that is more than
sufficient.”126 A senior software engineer, who has been implementing
software projects for over a decade and is now leading teams executing
projects for U.S. clients, further explained, “[P]atents are irrelevant to
Indian software firms for all practical purposes, and constitute less than
.01 percent of most Indian software firms’ bottom-line.”127 The senior
member of management who has served over two decades at this
software firm corroborates the senior software engineer’s assessment:
“Even if we are supremely generous, revenues from patent and
intellectual property royalties constitutes no more than 1 percent of the
total revenues for any of the top Indian software firms. And this does not
exceed 3–5 percent of the total revenues, even in the financial products

ITERATIONS: INTERDISC. J. SOFTWARE HIST. 3 (May 3, 2004), available at
http://www.cbi.umn.edu/iterations/parthasarathy.pdf.
124
Building The India Brand In Software, NASSCOM, http://epi.nasscom
.in/Nasscom/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=5355 (last updated Nov. 29, 2006).
The interesting discussion on the evolution of NASSCOM priorities
demonstrates that IP is not of major consequence to the larger companies,
though it may be more pertinent to smaller companies. Moreover, the focus is on
creating innovative and IP work, and not increasing the legal coverage of
software (further evidence negating the IP-growth argument). See also
Reinventing Nasscom – Three Eras (A Story on EMERGE Forum), EMERGE
COMMUNITY, NASSCOM (Feb. 11, 2010, 12:11 PM), http://nasscomemerge.groupsite.com/discussion/topic/show/286188.
125
It is theoretically possible that the increase in IT growth would have been
greater if accompanied by more IP protection. However, this argument appears
highly improbable in light of the industry response and, hence, shall be
eliminated for the purpose of this Article.
126
Interview with Management, supra note 112.
127
Interview with senior software engineer of a top-five Indian software firm,
Chennai, India, (Mar. 20, 2011). The interviewee preferred to remain
anonymous because some of the shared information is confidential financial data
related to the business of the firm.
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division.”128 The financial products division, or “vertical” in the software
industry parlance, has the highest potential for IP revenue as it primarily
involves sales of fully-developed software tools.
Clearly, the software industry is growing at a robust pace, fuelled
by strong profits. Indeed, additional revenue from IP royalties appears
unnecessary. On the basis of the software industry data from India, we
can reasonably conclude that software will be produced even without
property rights. Moreover, this industry data enables us to arrive at this
conclusion without requiring us to first prove the counterintuitive
argument—that altruistic motivations are more persuasive than
property.129 Thus, the Indian experience provides direct evidence that
profits are sufficient, which relieves scholars of the requirement to
establish the moral motivations of software engineers.
5. Responses to Anticipated Objections
Several objections to the interpretation of the Indian data may
arise. The first objection is that the Indian software industry consists
largely of low-end products and services.130 It could be argued that
India’s software industry primarily produces low-grade products and
services (BPOs), or what are known as “call-centers.” However, callcenters do not primarily produce software programs, and are based on
cost advantage. In other words, the Indian software industry’s output
128

Interview with Management, supra note 112.
For discussions on how altruistic or non-commercial motivation can be
assessed and measured, see Clippinger & Bollier, supra note 90, at 266–75
(arguing for social trust and cooperation as an enduring theme in human
evolution); Ghosh, supra note 71, at 164, 166 (arguing for cooking-pot markets
and for studies of various motivation categories that exist as possible sources of
value inflow). See also Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Cooking Pot Markets: An
Economic Model for the Trade in Free Goods and Services on the Internet,
FIRST MONDAY (Mar. 2, 1998), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/580/501.
130
See, e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit, India: Telecoms and Technology
Background, ECONOMIST (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.eiu.com/index.asp?
layout=ib3Article&article_id=1668066166&pubtypeid=1162462501&category_
id=775133077&country_id=1570000157&page_title=Forecast&rf=0 (indicating
that India did not historically develop innovative products and services, but also
arguing that “faster growth in this segment is likely as Indian firms invest more
heavily in research and development”). I do not argue whether or not Indian
software firms’ products are “superior” or “inferior” to software industries
located in any other country. The ECONOMIST article is however sufficient to
demonstrate the more modest point that Indian software engineers or firms are
capable of producing high-end products, and thus, disproving the argument that
the industry is solely a low-end product producer, incapable of creating products
worthy of IP protection.
129
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does not meet the minimum standards to be eligible for patents or
copyrights, which explains why industry does not pursue such
protections. And so, the data from Indian industry arguably do not
accurately reflect the impact of property rights. The figures, however,
rebut this claim. BPOs have historically contributed less than 18–20
percent of the total revenues and did not exceed 50 percent even at its
peak in 2009.131
A second and closely related objection is that the Indian
industry’s success is perhaps primarily a result of cost advantage. As for
the BPO objection, it could be argued that the software industry
flourishes in India because labor is cheaper than in the United States.
Hence, American firms outsource the software jobs to Bangalore, and the
Indian data does not reliably answer whether innovation industries
depend upon IP protections. This doubt is set to rest by existing
American and other international scholarship.132 As Annalee Saxenian
points out, post-Y2K, western countries recognized Indian firms are
sources of scarce technical talent or high-quality services, rather than
just cheap labor.133 Indeed, Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella
argue comparative advantage “is simply too coarse to explain” India’s
software advantage.134
Moreover, even if we accept that comparative cost advantage
provided the initial advantage, “access to a cheap and skilled workforce
has [however] eroded over time.”135 If cheap labor is the causal factor for
131

BPOs accounted for less than 18.2 percent and 20.1 percent of India’s total
industry exports in 2003–04 and 2004–05. See NASSCOM, INDIAN IT-BPO
INDUSTRY 2009, supra note 115.
132
See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 122; Asma Lateef,
LINKING UP WITH THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: A CASE STUDY OF THE BANGALORE
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, ch. 2 (1997), available at http://ilo-mirror.library.cornell
.edu/public/english/bureau/inst/papers/1997/dp96/index.htm (arguing that the
revenues in the business of software development are largely in software
packages and turnkey projects; while barriers to entry are too low in bodyshopping, which suffered from reduced margins and had also become
“logistically more difficult and financially less viable,” due to visa restrictions
and other factors beyond the firms’ control).
133
See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 122, at 276, 285
(emphasis added).
134
See Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella, Bridging the Gap: Conclusions,
in FROM UNDERDOGS TO TIGERS: THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE SOFTWARE
INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA, IRELAND AND ISRAEL, 275, 289 (2005).
135
Id. at 276. See also Suma S. Athreye, The Indian Software Industry, in FROM
UNDERDOGS TO TIGERS: THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
IN BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA, IRELAND AND ISRAEL, 7, 33–34 (2005) (disproving the
comparative cost advantage myth. Athreye analyzed the different periods in the
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the industry’s growth in India, then in the early 1990s, when the wages
for software programmers increased in India, other countries such as
China or the Philippines should have displaced India.136 Instead, as
demonstrated in Figure 1, when the cost advantage was eroding, the
Indian software industry grew at an even faster pace.
A third objection to the evidence that India’s information
industry demonstrates that software industry does not require IP to
flourish may be as follows. Perhaps, India does not develop innovative
products and services eligible for protection under IP regimes.137
However, the industry perception in the United States directly contradicts
this idea: U.S. firms contracting with Indian software firms insist that all
IP rights (including patents, copyright, residuary IP rights, and future
development rights) stemming from the Indian software firm’s work
should be transferred to the U.S. firm. American firms would hardly
insist that the Indian firm transfer all rights in IP to the U.S. firm if the
work is low-end and not worthy of protection under IP laws in the first
place.138 A senior member of management and business head at a top-

growth of the software industry in India. Despite tight tight labor markets, there
were over 30 percent increases in wages per annum in the mid-1990s for
instance) (citation omitted). Ashish Arora et al. built on the Athreye evidence to
argue that if it were just plain wage advantage, when Indian salaries rose and it
was cheaper to hire Russian programmers, the software industry would have
taken off in Russia and displaced India. However, even though Intel, Sun, and
others established software development centers in Russia, the industry and
exports remain small. Similarly, even though trained Russian engineers and
scientists possessed backgrounds in software and computers, they were unable
to successfully set up software firms when they migrated to Israel as well. See
Ashish Arora, Alfonso Gambardella & Steven Klepper, Organizational
Capabilities and the Rise of the Software Industry in the Emerging Economies:
Lessons from the History of some US Industries, in FROM UNDERDOGS TO
TIGERS: THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL,
CHINA, INDIA, IRELAND AND ISRAEL, 171, 197 (2005).
136
Arora & Gambardella, supra note 134, at 276.
137
Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 130.
138
It could be argued that because Indian firms do not protect their IP, it is
potentially a “zero cost” insistence. This objection fails to explain why Indian
firms would behave so irrationally. Given the global nature of software firms
and services, if IP is critical, why would Indian firms not file patents in the
United States or the United Kingdom where they operate and which provide
strong patent and copyright protection for software? Rationally, the Indian
software firms could then monetize the IP by adding a price tag to it and
charging clients a fee for use of it. The senior management head of a top-five
software firm in India confirms that any price quotes to clients are determined
solely on project costs. There is no dollar value added directly or indirectly in
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five Indian software firm confirms that U.S. firms insist upon such full
transfers of all IP rights. He further adds, in the occasional situations
when Indian firms asked to retain IP rights and were willing to reduce
prices or compensate the U.S. firm, negotiations were delayed and
unsuccessful.139
Other indices also confirm software firms and engineers in India
are as capable as their counterparts in other parts of the world. For
instance, a significant number of Indian software firms figure
prominently in the Bloomberg Top 100 IT companies, published in
2010.140 Data indicates software engineers in India produce patentable
software comparable to that of their U.S. counterparts. Such data
includes instances of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO)
granting patents to the Indian research wings of U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs),141 and Indian employees in MNCs like
Intel are granted U.S. patents in numbers comparable to similarly
situated American employees.142 A number of studies show “MNCs’

lieu of IP royalties or for transfer of IP to the client. Interview with
Management, supra note 112.
139
Id.
140
Four of the top 20, and seven in the top 50, are Indian software companies—
not counting Indian divisions of parent companies listed elsewhere. The Tech
100, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, http://www.businessweek.com/interactive
_reports/it100_2010.html?chan=technology_special+report+--+tech+100_specia
l+report+--+tech+100 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
141
See also Ashutosh Sheshabalaya, Enduring an IT Eclipse, YALEGLOBAL
ONLINE (Aug. 30, 2005), http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/enduring-it-eclipse.
142
Saritha Rai, In India, A High-Tech Outpost for U.S. Patents, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/15/business/technology-inindia-a-high-tech-outpost-for-us-patents.html (“The work of these engineers is
generating significant amounts of intellectual property for American companies
like Cisco Systems, General Electric, I.B.M., Intel, Motorola and Texas
Instruments—whose various Indian units have filed more than 1,000 patent
applications with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Some
applications, with patents already granted, date to the early 1990’s. . . . ‘Thirty
percent of all software for Motorola’s latest phones is written in India,’ said
Sammy Sana, managing director of Motorola India Electronics. . . . Mr. Prasad’s
team has filed 6 of the 60 United States patent applications from Intel’s India
unit in the last 22 months. . . . The center’s rate of innovation compares
favorably with Intel’s mature development centers in the United States, said Mr.
Sampat, the Intel president in India, who holds six patents for his work in the
United States.”). See also John R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann,
Software Patents, Incumbents and Entry, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1579, 1621 (2007)
(arguing that, unlike the pharmaceutical and manufacturing industries, which
have “monolithic perspectives on patent policy,” the software industry is more
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R&D activities, especially in India, are quite isolated from the local
network of technological activities,”143 but sorting through the reasons
for this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Article. For now, this
evidence is adequate to assess Indian engineers’ capabilities and counter
any objection that Indian engineers are not capable of producing patentor copyright-worthy programs.
A fourth anticipated objection is that the Indian industry is
primarily “services-oriented” rather than “production-oriented,” and
because patents essentially protect products, the Indian industry is
indifferent toward patents. This clichéd explanation that India is
primarily a service provider rather than producing software products can
be easily set to rest. Indian firms sell products to banks and clients in the
finance industry, but even in this context, the royalties from IP do not
contribute more than 1–3 percent of the total revenue, as discussed
earlier.144 Even if, arguendo, the lack of patent pursuit is because of the
nature of the Indian industry’s output, this story still does not explain
why the industry does not pursue copyright protection in that case.145 For
instance, the unique selling point of Indian software firms is the
sophisticated engineering capability they possess.146 On this basis, they
offer engineering R&D services to clients.147 For example, Infosys,
India’s second-largest software firm, offers an ancillary service in the
agricultural machinery manufacturing industry.148 Infosys designs
fragmented and “each firm . . . seems to have a different position on patent
policy—a position that is likely to change from time to time.”).
143
See, e.g., Marco Giarratana, Alessandro Pagano & Salvatore Torrisi, The
Role of the Multinational Companies, in FROM UNDERDOGS TO TIGERS: THE
RISE AND GROWTH OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA,
IRELAND AND ISRAEL, 207, 220 (Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella eds.,
2005) (arguing that, though Texas Instruments (India) has been awarded
seventy-five patents by the USPTO from 1976 to 2002, its patents have never
been cited by Indian firms). See id. at 219 for a discussion on this empirical
study and its limitations.
144
See supra Part II.A.3.
145
A separate, alternate argument (and effective counter to this India-is-aservice-industry objection) is that information services (and services in general)
will increasingly dominate society worldwide. See, e.g., Kenneth Dam, SelfHelp in the Digital Jungle, in EXPANDING BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 103, 104–05 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
146
See, e.g., INFOSYS LIMITED, http://www.infosys.com/services/Pages/index.as
px (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).
147
Id.
148
B. K. SATHISH, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN OUTSOURCING
PRODUCT DESIGN & ENGINEERING, available at http://www.infosys.com/
engineering-services/white-papers/Documents/outsourcing-design-engineering.p
df (last updated Jan. 2009).
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“cabins, exteriors, structural components and detailed engineering
activities.”149 Even if the output from these services does not fit the
novelty standards required for a patent (or a design right in Europe), the
computer program for the cabin designs, detailed engineering activities
could easily be copyrighted under U.S. or Indian laws. Nevertheless,
Indian software firms do not pursue IP protection. This non IP-pursuing
behavior on the part of Indian software firms is particularly odd when the
standards for copyright and patent eligibility generally have been
lowered in the U.S. and in other important economic markets.150
A fifth potential objection to the persuasiveness of the Indian
data is that Indian software growth is fuelled by global incentives (or IP
protection under the Berne Convention, other international laws, or the
laws of another nation).151 This concern may also be easily set to rest.
There is no evidence that Indian firms are forum shopping or opting to
file for patents or pursuing copyright protection in the United States (or
other jurisdictions that provide more protection for software).152 Thus,
we can eliminate the potential argument that external IP incentives may
be driving innovation in India. The patent applications filed in India
corroborate that IP is not driving the industry in India: MNCs and U.S.
corporations applied for more patents than did Indian firms.153 Annalee
Saxenian articulates a subtler form of the global incentives argument: the
software industry in India may be driven by India-born engineers in the
United States.154 This phenomenon may be a contributing factor, but it
does not explain why India has been so successful in developing the

149

Id. at 3.
See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 54, for discussion on much lowered copyright
eligibility standards in the context of functional directories. This Article refrains
from proceeding into the separate question of whether software patents are of
lower quality than in other areas as it is not necessary for the purpose of this
paper. For a discussion and analysis of this topic, see generally John R. Allison
& Ronald J. Mann, The Disputed Quality of Software Patents, 85 WASH. L. REV.
297 (2007).
151
I thank Professor Dreyfuss for raising this interesting possibility.
152
See Interview with Management, supra note 112.
153
Sheshabalaya, supra note 141 (“In just two years since the process formally
took shape, Indian R&D centers of American tech firms were filing more
patents than Bell Labs.”); see also ASHUTOSH SHESHABALAYA, RISING
ELEPHANT: THE GROWING CLASH WITH INDIA OVER WHITE COLLAR JOBS AND
ITS CHALLENGE TO AMERICA AND THE WORLD (2004); Arora & Gambardella,
supra note 134, at 293, 299 (arguing that supply of skilled labor and
international links were critical conditions for a software model of development
and this may not be easy to create).
154
See SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 122, at 286–87.
150
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software industry when compared to China, Bangladesh, or several other
countries that have sizeable expatriate population in the United States.155
In sum, a number of the anticipated objections to the
persuasiveness of the data from India can be set to rest. The following
Part analyzes the IP laws and enforcement practices in India to
demonstrate the IP regime is weak.

B. Weak Intellectual Property Protection
The IP regime in India is relatively weak and has remained so
throughout the period of interest. Examining existing laws is crucial to
determining if (i) the existing protection is robust or (ii) there is any
secret sauce in Indian IP law that has created such idyllic conditions for
software industry growth in India. Moreover, the analysis helps to
eliminate an alternative explanation that perhaps Indian firms are not
pressing for increases in IP because a priori protection is maximized or
optimal. The following section shall resolve this concern by examining
existing copyright and patent laws, thereby confirming IP protection
remained weak throughout the period. Part II.B.1 will examine the extent
of copyright protection, and Part II.B.2 shall eliminate the alternate
causal story that perhaps the Indian industry is not pursuing copyright
protection because they are protected sufficiently under patent law—a far
more robust protection. Even though copyright is the main focus of this
Article, as clearly explained in the Introduction, an examination of patent
law will eliminate this alternate causal story.
1. Copyright – Almost Negligible Protection
Though software is protected under Indian copyright law, this
protection is not particularly robust: (a) Indian copyright laws do not
provide any special protection over and above other countries’ laws, (b)
software firms in the United States and in India made tacit arrangements
to access each other’s IP portfolios and did not pursue any infringement
actions, and (c) ample studies documenting piracy in India (and the
resulting revenue losses to software firms) negates any argument that
copyright is a priori so well-protected that firms do not seek increases in
property protection or sue for infringement.
First, like the United States, India provides copyright protection
for software. The Indian Copyright Act of 1957156 was amended in 1994
155

The limitation of this emigrant theory is that it fails to explain why the
industry took root in India and not in China, Europe or other countries from
which the United States historically has a high number of immigrants. Further,
Saxenian herself acknowledges elsewhere that it is about “Talent, Talent,
Talent.” Id. at 285. See, e.g., Arora, Gambardella & Klepper, supra note 135, at
197.
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to include software within the definition of a literary work.157 But the text
does not indicate any additional protection in comparison to that which is
available in other countries. The Indian Copyright Act (like U.S.
copyright law) protects software against piracy or plain-vanilla copying
and prohibits derivative programs.158 The Act prohibits derivative
programs because software is excluded from the definition of permissible
“fair use.”159 Hence, adopting part of a program or building upon it to
create derivative works is illegal. The Indian Copyright Act even curtails
plain-vanilla copying by lawful purchasers (for instance, a purchaser is
permitted to use a program on only one machine).160 It is worth noting,
however, though these provisions prohibiting derivative work and
limiting copying by lawful purchasers exist on the statute books, there is
no evidence to suggest they are enforced.

156

Indian Copyright Act, 1957, available at http://copyright.gov.in/Documents
/CopyrightRules1957.pdf.
157
Id. Section 2(o) of the 1957 Indian Copyright Act reads, “‘literary work’
includes computer programmes, tables and compilations including computer
data bases” (emphasis added). See also § 2(ffb) for a definition of computer and
§ 2(ffc) for definition of computer programme. Section 2(ffb) reads, “‘computer’
includes any electronic or similar device having information processing
capabilities”; § 2(ffc) reads, “‘computer programme’ means a set of instructions
expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form, including a machine
readable medium, capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or
achieve a particular result” (emphasis added).
158
Computer programs have been excluded from the fair use defense. Section 52
reads, “Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright. 1. The following acts
shall not constitute an infringement of copyright namely: a. a fair dealing with a
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work not being a computer programme for
the purposes of—i. private use including research; ii. criticism or review,
whether of that work or of any other work” (emphasis added). Id. The U.S.
Copyright Code provides the same legal result but arrives at it from a slightly
different path. It disallows adaptations as an infringing derivative work but
allows for a limited exception when a “new copy or adaptation is created as an
essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no such other manner.” 17 U.S.C. §117(a) (2006);
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
159
Indian Copyright Act, 1957.
160
Id. Section 52 of the Indian Copyright Act reads, “Certain acts not to be an
infringement of copyright. . . . (aa) the making of copies or adaptation of a
computer programme by the lawful possessor of a copy of such computer
programme, from such copy—(i) in order to utili[z]e the computer programme
for the purpose for which it was supplied; or (ii) to make back-up copies purely
as a temporary protection against loss, destruction or damage in order only to
utili[z]e the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied”
(emphasis added).
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As a result of the 1994 amendments, piracy in computer software
is a criminal offense, but the maximum sentence (three years
imprisonment and/or $1,200–4,800 or 50,000–2,00,000 as fines), is not
particularly high.161 The fines are reduced (to $1,200 or 50,000) if the
infringer did not sell the illegal copies.162 The low fine is justified as
commensurate with the low per capita income in India. Plainly, this low
fine is not a major deterrent, and weakens any argument that Indian law
may a priori provide robust copyright protection.
Second, the industry also appears to have adopted a far more
relaxed infringement standard than that which is provided by law.
Indeed, a senior management official of a top-five Indian software firm
said, “Any program consists of thousands of lines of code. The question
of copyright infringement only arises if the software programmer does a
‘copy and paste’ (or ‘cut and paste’). But if she remembers something
and uses it (or memory recall insertions), it can hardly be copyright
infringement.”163 This illuminating comment reveals an industry attitude
that is distinct from infringement standards recognized by U.S. and
Indian copyright law today.164
161

Id. Section 63B of the Indian Copyright Act states, “Knowing use of
infringing copy of computer programme to be an offence. Any person who
knowingly makes use on a computer of an infringing copy of a computer
programme shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than seven days but which may extend to three years and with fine which
shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to two lakh
rupees:
Provided that where the computer programme has not been used for gain or in
the course of trade or business, the court may, for adequate and special reasons
to be mentioned in the judgment, not impose any sentence of imprisonment and
may impose a fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees” (emphasis
added).
162
Id.
163
See Interview with Management, supra note 112.
164
For the reader’s ease, I will use American case law here and introduce Indian
legal tests only when Indian law on point is different. Because the United States
has led in innovation and IP law developments, including pioneering case law,
Indian law has been much influenced by, and draws heavily on, developments in
American law. See Rachna Desai, Copyright Infringement in the Indian Film
Industry, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 259, 264 (2005) (“Indian copyright laws
resemble American copyright laws.”). See also id. for a discussion of the
similarities between U.S. and Indian copyright law, including originality and
various other copyright precepts. In fact, U.S. case law is often cited and relied
upon by Indian judges. Interestingly, the Indian Supreme Court and High Courts
have cited decisions by U.S. courts on IP law, such as Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980), rather than U.K. decisions on point. This is a notable
departure from the practice of citing U.K. cases in constitutional or tort law, for
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Conceivably, repeating code even from memory would
constitute infringement under existing standards for copyright
infringement. This standard is applied for other types of work protected
under copyright law, such as music and literary work. Repeating portions
of a tune or paragraphs of a literary work constitutes copyright
infringement in both India and the United States.165 Even subconscious
copying constitutes infringement, and furnishing proof of deliberate
copying or intention is unnecessary.166 Moreover, striking similarity (or
identical portions) would be sufficient, and access to the original work
would be automatically presumed.167 Striking similarity is even sufficient
for summary judgment.168 Indian courts apply the substantial copying
test,169 which is very similar to the substantial or striking similarity test

instance. Indian attorneys’ briefs submitted to the courts also demonstrate a
marked number of U.S. cases being cited in IP briefs. Furthermore, like U.S.
copyright law, Indian copyright law also originates from British copyright law,
which justifies the generality of this discussion. Copyright law was introduced in
India by the Copyright Act of 1914, which essentially extended the British
Copyright Act of 1911 to India. At the beginning, Indian copyright law
borrowed extensively from the United Kingdom Copyright Act of 1956. Indian
copyright is now governed by the Indian Copyright Act of 1957. See, e.g., P.
NARAYANAN, COPYRIGHT LAW (1986); Copyright law of India, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copyright_law_of_India (last modified June 27,
2011).
165
See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 851
(1947). For a similar rule in India, see R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, A.I.R. 1978
SC 1613 (India).
166
See, e.g., Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000);
Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 181
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (explaining infringement of copyright occurs even if
“subconsciously accomplished.” In other words, when there is significant
similarity and access, it will constitute infringement even if copying was not
deliberately intended). See also NARAYANAN, supra note 164, §§ 14.10, 14.16
(1986) (discussing intention is not required in India either. Moreover, once
similarity is proved, it can be relied on either directly or indirectly).
167
See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding access was presumed on the basis of the top-hit status of the
plaintiff’s song). See also NARAYANAN, supra note 164, §14.16.
168
See Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997) (reiterating that striking
similarity would by itself constitute proof of access sufficient to withstand
summary judgment).
169
INDIA DEPARTMENT OF SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION, A Handbook
of Copyright Law, MINISTRY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA, http://www.education.nic.in/copyright.asp (last visited June 5, 2011). See
also NARAYANAN, supra note 164, §§ 14.11, 14.16 (stating India follows the
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applied in the United States.170 Hence, repeating significant portions of
the code would most likely constitute infringement on the grounds that it
is either a direct copy or a derivative work.171 India is silent on whether
she will adopt the U.S. abstraction-filtration-comparison test172 for
software infringement (as did the United Kingdom, Canada, and
France).173 Whether or not India adopts this specific test for software
infringement, the industry still appears to have taken a view that
meaningfully differs from the legal standard for infringement.174
Tellingly, no Indian firm is addressing potential derivative work
infringement. It is highly improbable that existing programs are not
substantial and material copying standard. Moreover, it is not only the quantity
but also the quality of material copied that is also key).
170
See Substantial Similarity, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substan
tial_similarity (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). For discussion on the de minimis
requirement for infringement, what constitutes substantial similarity, etc., see
also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 526. Also, there exists a split on
whether the substantial similarity should be tested vis-à-vis the whole of the
copied portions or only compare the copied material after removing the
uncopyrightable elements (such as facts, ideas, etc.). For discussion on these
multiple approaches to substantial similarity, see id. at 554.
171
See, e.g., Micro Star v. FormGen Inc. 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998). In this
case, FormGen Inc. owned, made, and distributed a very popular computer
game. FormGen encouraged players to create their own levels and post them on
the Internet for others to download. Micro Star downloaded these user-created
levels onto CDs and sold them. Micro Star argued there was no derivative work
infringement because, though the new user-levels reference the source art
history, they did not actually contain the original art files themselves. The court
disagreed and found derivative work infringement on the basis of ownership in
sequels. In other words, the new levels would constitute sequels and FormGen
would in this case own all the right to sequels as for traditional copyright subject
matter such as literary works.
172
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). See
also Bruce Abramson, Promoting Innovation In The Software Industry: A First
Principles Approach To Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
75, 123 (2002); Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics For An Old Melody: The
Idea/expression Dichotomy In The Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 691, 695–96 (1999). For a discussion on how the abstraction-filtrationcomparison test is the computer program equivalent of the substantial similarity
test, and on the exclusion of elements dictated by efficiency (or how the
expression would be deemed to have merged with the idea, disallowing a
monopoly right grant), see GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 47, at 564, 566.
173
MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 55 (3d ed. 2006).
174
Other industries also appear to adopt similar relaxed standards of “remixing,”
for instance, to suit industry needs. See, e.g., Hemphill & Suk, supra note 14, at
1196 (demonstrating that the fashion industry adopts a liberal standard for
“remixing” to suit industry needs).
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forming part of the code in new programs when programmers switch
employers, set up new firms, or even work on projects for their firms’
new clients. The suggestion that programmers prefer to re-invent the
wheel (or start from scratch) rather than utilize code they may have
previously written or that is familiar seems implausible. Further, the
argument that no program contains prior code is even more tenuous
given the functional nature of software, which allows for limited
methods to achieve any task in an efficient number of steps.
Interestingly, like its Indian counterpart, the U.S. software
industry is applying a more blurred (or generous) infringement standard,
albeit in the area of patents. Ronald Mann argues that, as a result of the
“increasing complexity and interdependence of innovation,” all major
firms need to access each other’s IP.175 Moreover, “many of the most
important firms are developing and selling products that at least infringe
in some way on patents held by several other major players in the
industry.”176 The major firms could test the relative strengths of their
portfolio through litigation, but are instead choosing to enter a web of
cross-licensing agreements, as formal or informal tacit arrangements.177
Remarkably, the software industries in the United States and in
India exhibit near identical behavior, suggesting that perhaps this tacit
cross-licensing arrangement is necessary for the software industry. The
Indian software firms also do not pursue litigation or infringement
actions, suggesting a tacit arrangement similar to that of the U.S.
industry.178 A senior management officer of a top Indian software firm
assures “[t]here have been no known instances of an Indian software firm
suing another firm for intellectual property infringement or entering into
a settlement agreement for that matter.”179 Because computer programs
have been excluded from the fair use defense in India, and there is a high
probability of derivative work infringement, this lack of litigation (or
“zero IP disputes”) is striking. The senior management official clearly
stated there is no known instance of an Indian firm pursuing
infringement action in India or in any other country. Thus, we can put to
rest the possibility of forum shopping or that litigation in other countries
drives innovation in India. For instance, it could be argued Indian courts
are reputedly slow and firms therefore prefer to litigate elsewhere.
However, it would be rather absurd to argue IP protection is critical for
industry growth when no firm or industry level body in India seeks to
pursue IP safeguards.
175

Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16, at 10.
Id.
177
Id. (emphasis added).
178
Id.
179
Interview with Management, supra note 112.
176
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Many studies indicate high levels of piracy in India, weakening
the potential argument that litigation is unnecessary because copyright is
so well enforced in India. Diverse organizations ranging from the U.S.based Business Software Alliance to the Government of India’s Ministry
of Human Resources Development have documented piracy losses in
India. Estimates of losses stemming from piracy in the software industry
range from $151.3 million in 1995–96 (or 88.3 percent of the Indian
market that year) to $519 million in 2004.180 Indeed, the numbers would
be even higher if we included the losses from derivative works. The
methodology these studies employ to compute precise figures may draw
some criticism.181 For the purpose of this Article, however, these studies
suffice to establish the simple point that an absence of infringement suits
is not necessarily due to well-policed and enforced copyright in India.
Critics may point out that perhaps piracy affects non-Indian
firms instead of Indian firms, and therefore Indian firms are indifferent to
increases in IP protection and are not concerned with litigation and
copyright policing.182 In support of the contrary, several studies provide
estimates of losses incurred by Indian software firms. The BSA India
Report points out “a 10-point reduction in the current 74 percent piracy
rate would have enabled the [software] sector to have tripled its growth
180

The U.S.-based Business Software Alliance in its India Country Report
estimated losses of $519 million in 2004 because of piracy. The BSA India
Report estimates piracy losses grew by 74%, or was substantially higher than
$367 million in the previous year. THE BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE,
COUNTRY REPORT 2009 23 (2009) [hereinafter BSA India Report], available at
http://www.bsa.or.jp/file/Country_One_Pagers.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
The Indian Ministry of Human Resources Development pegged losses from
illegal application software at $2.3 million ( 10.63 crores) in 1996–97 and also
cited a NASSCOM study estimating the revenue losses from piracy at $151.3
million ( 545,00,000), or 88.3% of the total Indian market in 1995–96. See N.K.
NAIR ET AL., GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF HUMAN RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT, STUDY ON COPYRIGHT PIRACY IN INDIA 6 (1999) [hereinafter
Ministry of HRD Study], available at http://www.education.nic.in/cr_piracy_st
udy/cpr5.asp.
181
See, e.g., BSA or Just BS? Software Theft is Bad; So Is Misstating the
Evidence, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/3
993427?story_id=3993427 (criticizing the computation methodology employed
by the BSA India Report); Ministry of HRD Study, supra note 180 (criticizing
the methodology employed by the BSA India Report and the NASSCOM study).
182
See, e.g, Ministry of HRD Study, supra note 180 (arguing Indian firms are
mostly involved in customized software and not packaged software). Since
piracy occurs mostly with packaged software, which is largely imported, Indian
firms are to a great extent unaffected by piracy. This Study however estimates
the Indian government lost import duties equivalent to $15 million (or 10% of
the $151.3 million that had been diverted from legal software).
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from $7.4 billion to $19.5 billion and added 364,000 [software] jobs in
the process.”183 The BSA India Report further argues (a) India has more
to gain than most from piracy reductions as it would increase local
industry revenues by more than $8.2 billion, and would generate $386
million in tax revenues,184 and (b) if the growth-inhibiting 74 percent
software piracy rate is reduced, India’s future growth would accelerate to
165 percent instead of 137 percent in 2004 to 2009, and more revenue
would be generated for India.185 The BSA India Report also argues that
losses in the domestic market alone amount to $7.4 billion.186 Yet, as the
senior management official of a top-five software firm confirms, Indian
software firms have not withheld sales of any product in India because of
copyright infringement concerns.187
If the BSA India Report is indeed correct, that curbing piracy
will accelerate growth, then why are Indian firms uninterested in IP
protection and enforcement? If it is indeed correct that IP protection is
vital for industry, why are Indian firms not pursuing infringement actions
or lobbying for piracy crackdowns?188 Instead, the well-regarded
software industry in India is strikingly silent and does not endorse IP
protection.189 To the contrary, several of India’s largest software firms

183

BSA India Report, supra note 180.
Id.
185
Id. According to the BSA India Report, the additional growth would provide
India more revenues—$1.1 billion in extra tax revenues per year, and $30 billion
in additional revenues per year.
186
Id.
187
Interview with Management, supra note 112.
188
It is noteworthy that Indian software firms are not filing IP infringement
actions against each other. By contrast, Indian corporations often engage in
litigation on a number of other matters. For instance, Tata Group, India’s
leading corporate house and parent to Tata Consultancy Services (India’s top
software firm), sues on a number of matters, as does Reliance Group and most
corporations in India. Simply stated, Indian firms understand Indian court
requirements and have no qualms in filing suits in a number of areas of law.
This fact resolves a potential objection that perhaps Indian firms prefer not to
litigate because court processes are slow and time-consuming. I thank Professor
Thomas Merrill for raising this interesting observation.
189
For a detailed discussion of the software industry’s contribution to the
economy, global perception of India, and well-organized lobby, see supra Part
II.A. For the role of software in the economy, see INDIA IN BUSINESS,
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ENABLED
SERVICES (ITES), http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/industry-infrastructure/ser
vice-sectors/it.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011).
184
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support open source development,190 just as some firms in the United
States do.191
The IP regime in India is relatively weak and has remained so
throughout the period of interest. The reasonable conclusion is that the
software industry does not depend upon copyright. This narrative is
particularly compelling because it emerges from the fastest growing
software industry in the world.192
2. Patent Protection – Disinterested Industry
This Article focuses on the relationship between software and
copyright law, but to eliminate patent as an alternate causal story, this
Part will discuss how the industry is equally unaffected by patent cover.
As alluded to in Part II.A, a law providing patents for software was
introduced in India in 2004 and subsequently withdrawn in 2005. These
events allow scholars to observe whether the industry was affected by an
increase or decrease in IP protection. This Part will examine these two
“experiments” in patent law and their effect on the software industry.
However, with regard to patents, this Article shall confine itself to this
limited question as it is not intended to be an analysis of patent law per
se.193
190

Wipro and HCL Infosystems, the second- and fifth-largest Indian software
firms, support open source. See, e.g., Press Release, Red Hat Strengthens Partner
Network in Northern India, RED HAT (Nov. 5, 2006), http://www.apac.redhat.co
m/news/article/490.html. For more details on Wipro, see WIPRO IT BUSINESS,
http://www.wipro.com/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (explaining that
Wipro is one of the largest Indian IT companies generating revenues over $6.03
billion in 2010, employing over one hundred thousand employees, and rated as
the ninth most valuable brand in India). For more details on HCL, see HCL,
http://www.hcl.in/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) (explaining that HCL is the fifth
largest Indian IT enterprise with annual revenues of $5.5 billion after its
founding in 1976 as a garage start-up).
191
See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1451–52, nn.101–02.
192
Note that some public statements have been made to the effect that India is
cracking down on piracy. See, e.g., NIRUPAM BAJPAI & VANITA SASTRI,
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN INDIA: A CASE STUDY 8 (Harvard Inst. for Int’l Dev.,
Discussion Paper No. 667, 1998), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/h
iid/667.pdf; IPR Law in India, NASSCOM, http://epi.nasscom.in/Nasscom
/templates/NormalPage.aspx?id=6250 (last updated June 30, 2006) (claiming
that Indian copyright laws are some of the toughest in the world and that
consequently “abuse has been reduced,” and “raids have had salutary effect.”).
There is, however, no evidence supporting such claims of anti-piracy
crackdowns.
193
For a general discussion about issues related to software patents, see ROBERT
MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
131–41, 151–65 (3d ed. 2002).
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Accordingly, this Part will cover a number of discrete ideas. (i)
The Indian software industry does not endorse or advocate for software
patents. (ii) Despite industry disinterest, and though the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement)
did not require it, the Indian government included software patents
within the amendments proposed to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.
(iii) Software programmers, the main intended beneficiaries of this
government initiative, criticized software patents. (iv) Industry did not
endorse the government’s software patent proposal, in striking contrast to
its reaction to other laws. (v) Further, statistics reveal non-software firms
are filing most of the applications for software patents, which suggests
the industry does not depend upon patents to fuel growth.
Providing patents for software is another method of considerably
strengthening IP barriers. However, Indian firms and software
programmers are not lobbying for or even endorsing patent safeguards
for software. NASSCOM, as indicated earlier, is “the industry
association for the IT-BPO sector in India,” and its member firms
represent over 95 percent of India’s software industry.194 NASSCOM, in
conjunction with the Boston Consulting Group, published the
NASSCOM-BCG Innovation Report, Unleashing the Innovation Power
of IT-ITES Industry.195 This Report studied the factors the industry needs
in order to continue growth, and makes no mention of the need for
patents (or any increase in IP protection for that matter).196
Nevertheless, in 2004, India introduced software patents as part
of the amendments proposed to harmonize Indian patent law with the
TRIPS Agreement, and despite the fact that the TRIPS Agreement did
not require software patents.197 The proposal suggested an amendment to
194

See Vision and Mission, NASSCOM, http://www.nasscom.in/vision-andmission (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
195
NASSCOM & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, NASSCOM-BCG INNOVATION
REPORT 2007: UNLEASHING THE INNOVATION POWER OF IT-ITES INDUSTRY
(2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/221385/Nasscom-BCG-Innovati
on-report-2007India (last visited Dec. 18, 2011).
196
See id. Strikingly, the Report focuses on the need to increase the number of
IP-driven firms but does not advocate any need for patent or additional IP laws.
In this context, it is difficult to be persuaded that industry requires IP protections
in order to flourish, and yet does not request increases in IP laws.
197
As a signatory of the TRIPS Agreement, India was obligated to amend its
patent laws by Jan. 1, 2005 to bring it into conformity with the conditions laid
down in the TRIPS Agreement. Though the initial deadline was January 2000,
Art. 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement extended the deadline to January 2005 for
developing countries like India, which did not provide product patents. India
availed itself of this shelter and, hence, was required to amend its patent law by
no later than Jan. 1, 2005. See Prabhu Ram, India’s New “TRIPS-Compliant”
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the provision listing the exclusions, or subject-matter, which could not be
patented.198 Indian firms did nothing to endorse or support this initiative
to secure more protection via patent law.
Instead, software programmers and others members of the
industry argued against the patent proposal.199 Indeed, many
programmers in India organized and participated in a candlelight vigil to
protest against software patents.200 Legal scholars and constitutional
experts believed it was improper for the government to introduce this
provision as part of the amendments intended for TRIPS compliance.201
Patent Regime, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 195, 196 (2006). We can eliminate
the potential argument that industry lobbied the government to introduce
patents. See, e.g., Prabir Purkayastha, Software Patenting: Huge Blow for India,
29 PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY 5 (2005), available at http://pd.cpim.org/2005/0130/0
1302005_snd.htm.
198
The provision excluding software was redefined. Patents were allowed for
“technical applications” when “combined with hardware,” thereby effectively
reversing the exclusion. See Statement by Kamal Nath, Minister of Commerce
and Industry (on the Ordinance providing for software patents), Dec. 27, 2004,
17:41 IST, available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=6074 (last
visited Dec. 20, 2011).
199
Software programmers and others criticized patent protection for software as
unsuited to the nature of software and inimical to innovation. Moreover, they
argued it is plainly incongruent to provide patent cover if software is combined
with hardware. See, e.g., Richard Stallman, Speech at the Government Model
Engineering College, India: The Danger of Software Patents (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/stallman-mec-india.html (criticizing
the Indian Ordinance creating software patents and discussing the problems of
software patents in general). For criticisms of the Ordinance in India, see
Siddharth Narain, A Costly Prescription, 22 THE FRONTLINE 4 (2005), available
at http://www.hindu.com/fline/fl2204/stories/20050225002609700.htm; FSF
India’s Response to the Draft Patents Manual, FREE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION OF
INDIA, http://www.gnu.org.in/fsf-indias-response-to-the-draft-patents-manual/
(last visited Apr. 13, 2011). For similar criticisms of the U.K. proposal and
efforts to introduce software patents in Europe, see posting of Leader, Software
Patents Make a Mockery of European Ideals, ZDNETUK (Mar. 7, 2005, 1:35
PM),
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/compliance/2005/03/07/software-patentsmake-a-mockery-of-european-ideals-39190515/.
200
See Candle Light Vigil Against Software Patents, FREE SOFTWARE
FOUNDATION OF INDIA, http://www.gnu.org.in/candle-light-vigil-againstsoftware-patents (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
201
See Amit Sen Gupta, Side Effects: Patents Ordinance to hit Pharma, Software
Sectors, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 17, 2005), http://articles.timesofindia
.indiatimes.com/2005-02-17/edit-page/27831690_1_new-patent-regime-patentlaw-patents-act (“The new Ordinance has supposedly been brought in to make
the Patent Act TRIPS-compliant. The old Act (modified in 2002) has exactly the
language given in TRIPS on this count, so it was TRIPS-compliant. Therefore,
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There are many reasons why the software industry may have
problems with patents. Empirical studies in the United States now
indicate, even though “the patent monopoly is most commonly justified
on the ground of providing incentives to innovate,” “patents offer
relatively mixed to weak incentives to engage in innovation” in the high
technology software industry.202
First, granting software patents increases the price of software
products and services. Software firms may engage in defensive patenting
to avoid infringement claims and thereby set off a “patent arms race.”203
As Colleen Chien explains, building a patent arsenal is one of the top
reasons high-tech companies get patents—so that they can guard against
the risk of expensive patent litigation.204 Unlike copyright, which
attaches automatically at the time of creation, a patent involves
expensive filing procedures. Costs will multiply in the case of software
as firms will need to duplicate application filings in the various
jurisdictions where the software firm operates (or provides services). The
higher costs and resulting losses in demand and industry growth are not
included by studies advocating for patents or estimating losses from
piracy.205
Providing patent coverage for software also creates an additional
license tier as firms must identify and negotiate cross-licensing
permissions, driving up the associated legal fees and transaction costs.
Ronald Mann argues there are indirect benefits from cross-licensing.206
the attempt to bring in software patenting through the new Ordinance, under the
guise of meeting the TRIPS deadline, is completely mala fide.”).
202
Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY. TECH. L.J.
1255, 1283 (2009), available at http://www.btlj.org/data/articles/24_feature.pdf.
203
See Colleen Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297,
299 (2010).
204
See id. For a discussion of this objection in the context of software patents in
India, see also Purkayastha, supra note 197. See also Meeting the Global
Competition A Challenge for Indian Software Companies, NAAVI.ORG (Mar. 29,
2003), http://www.naavi.org/cl_editorial_03/edit_29_mar_03_01.htm. For a
discussion on the trouble with trolls, see Robert Merges, The Trouble with
Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 124 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1583, 1586 (2009) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s opinion in the Supreme
Court decision of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. “An industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” (internal citations
omitted)).
205
See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of piracy loss studies.
206
Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 962.
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But he firmly rejects “patent use as a net benefit to the industry: absent
some other benefit, all firms would be better-off saving the costs of
obtaining patents.”207 Moreover, James Bessen’s 2011 study reveals the
increases in litigation risks associated with software patents.208 Bessen
further states, “[S]oftware patents were much more likely than other
patents to be involved in litigation,”209 and “the high litigation rates
might imply high social costs that would outweigh these meager benefits.
In addition, the litigation might also create disincentives for investing in
innovation.”210 On that basis, Bessen concludes, “[F]indings suggest that
the extension of patent eligibility for software might not have been
socially beneficial, at least not for the software industry.”211
Moreover, software programmers argue they would not gain
from patents in the first place.212 Under standard work for hire contracts,
the employer owns any IP that may result from the employee’s work. It
could be argued that employment or compensation may be contingent on
creating patentable work, and the software programmer could therefore
benefit from producing IP.213 But the facts and figures clearly indicate
otherwise. As discussed in detail earlier, income from IP royalties
contributes less than 1 percent of software firms’ overall revenues;214
207

Id. Moreover, providing patents creates additional licensing problems.
Because technology transforms so rapidly, drafting licensing contracts for
software is difficult. For a discussion on software licenses and the problems of
distributing tangible and intangible materials, see Michael J. Madison,
Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 275 (2003).
208
James Bessen, A Generation of Software Patents, (Boston Univ. School of
Law, Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-31, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868979.
209
Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Patents Will Harm India’s Software Industry, ONLYPUNJAB.COM (May 30,
2005, 12:31 PM), http://onlypunjab.com/fullstory2k5-insight-news-status-12newsID-7074.html. (For instance, Anand Babu, a Silicon Valley programmer
who helped build “Thunder,” one of the fastest computers in the world, pointed
out that software patents had not helped developers, including in the United
States. Nagarjuna, a software programmer in India, further argued that patents
for software in combination with hardware were illogical.) Note that software
developers surveyed in the United States in 1992 and 1996 and software firms
surveyed in the 1990s also opposed software patents. Hence, software
developers’ opposition to patents is not a singularly Indian feature, but suggests
it may be far more common than previously anticipated. See Bessen, supra note
208, at 2.
213
I thank Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss for pointing out this potential objection,
which would have been troubling if left unaddressed.
214
See supra Part II.A.2.
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thus, patent expectations from employee work are not central to the
decision to hire.215 Software programmers are not required to secure
patents or copyright as part of their job profiles or goals, and there is no
evidence in employment contracts or periodic employee appraisals to
suggest otherwise. The facts on the ground therefore demonstrate that IP
does not act as an indirect incentive to innovate via payroll.
Continuing with the Indian patent story, the Parliament rejected
an amendment that proposed patent measures for software. The Indian
Parliament’s reasoning was very similar to that of the European
Commission, which rejected the United Kingdom’s proposal to provide
software patents by one of the highest voting margins in the history of
the European Union.216 The European Commission’s rejection was
215

Robert Hunt & James Bessen, The Software Patent Experiment, BUS. REV.,
Q3 2004, at 22, 25–26, available at http://www.phil.frb.org/files/br/brq304r
h.pdf. Bessen and Hunt’s study also alludes to similar findings in the United
States. Software publishing and software services industries together accounted
for only 7% of software patents during the 1990s, even though they employed
33% of computer programmers. Evidently, patent expectation from employment
work was also not central in the United States.
216
Initially, the European Council adopted the Computer Implemented
Inventions Directive in March 2005. This was heavily criticized as being
adverse to Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and innovation. See
John Thomas, Letters to the Editor, EU Patent Ruling Will Slow Pace of
Innovation, FIN. TIMES (June 23, 2005), http://www.ft.cms/s/0/052d46ca-e38511d9-b6f0-00000e2511c8.html - axzz1dhrDZcJ2. But in the end, by the most
decisive vote in its history, the European Parliament rejected the collaborative
Directive, a move that was supported by most technology companies. See
Tobias Buck, Maija Pesola, & Raphael Minder, Drive Fails for Common
Software Patents in EU, FIN. TIMES (July 5, 2005), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s
/2/6f8da74e-ed8f-11d9-9ff5-00000e2511c8.html; see Tobias Buck, EU’s
Lawmakers Reject Software Patent Legislation, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2005),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6b002898-8154-11d9-a8de-00000e2511c 8.htmlaxzzldhrDZcJ2. However some argue the issue continues to surface in Brussels.
See, e.g., Ingrid Marson, Lobbyists Prepare for Next Software Patent Battle,
ZDNET (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/regulation/2006/01
/23/lobbyists-prepare-for-next-software-patent-battle-39248676/. Microsoft even
allegedly threatened to pull out Navison, a Danish subsidiary, if software patents
were not granted. For such allegations by sources close to Navision and denials
by Microsoft, see Microsoft: Give us Software Patents or we Move 800 Jobs Out
of Denmark, FFII, http://wiki.ffii.org/Navision050215En (last visited Dec. 20,
2011). The U.K. had proposed the inclusion of patents for software. See, e.g.,
Patenting Computer-Implemented Inventions (Software Patents), INTELLECTUAL
PROP. OFF., http://www.ipo.gov.uk/p-policy-computer.htm (last visited Feb. 13,
2011) (showing U.K. justification for software patents based on contribution);
see Intellectual Property Office Approves Software Patent for UK, THE
REGISTER (May 7, 2009), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/05/07/ipo_
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significantly influenced by the European Economic and Social
Committee’s Opinion published in September 2002.217 The Committee’s
main legal objection was that the doctrinal premise of the Proposal—the
distinction between “computer software by itself” and “software
producing technical results”—was “indefinable” and “the product of
legal casuistry.”218
In India, the software patent bill may have gained some traction
if software firms or NASSCOM had endorsed it. The industry enjoys
popular support for re-inventing the Indian image internationally,219 and
Nandan Nilekani, one of the founders of Infosys Ltd., is now an Indian

approve_software_patent/ (announcing a software patent because of “technical
contribution”); see Nokia Corporation [2009] BL 0/107/09 Intellectual Prop.
Off. (appeal taken from GB0424655.9), available at http://www.ipo.gov.
uk/o10709.pdf (software patent grant decision).
217
The European Economic and Social Committee’s Opinion is a part of the
EU’s mandatory legislative process. See Justine Pila, Software Patents,
Separation of Powers, and Failed Syllogisms: A Cornucopia from the Enlarged
Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 70 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 203, 210–
11 (2011).
218
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the Patentability of
Computer-Implemented Inventions,” [2003] OJ C61/154 [3.1] [hereinafter ESC
Opinion]. According to Justine Pila, this Opinion criticized the Proposal as a
partisan document that lacked a sound economic basis, showed insufficient
regard for public interest and democracy, and put Europe at risk of increased
legal uncertainty, and perhaps even “legal chaos.” See Pila, supra note 217, at
207. Moreover, the proposal was criticized as offering a “de facto acceptance
and justification of the a posteriori drift of EPO jurisprudence,” ESC Opinion, at
[3.1.1], eliminating the technological effect requirement of European Patent law,
for instance. See Pila, supra note 217, at 207. See also JUSTINE PILA, THE
REQUIREMENT FOR AN INVENTION IN PATENT LAW 242 (Oxford Univ. Press ed.,
2010). The European saga shared several similarities with the Indian episode.
The proposed Directive was criticized for content and the manner in which it
was formulated, much like the Ordinance in India. See supra Part II.B.2.
219
IT BPO SECTOR IN INDIA, supra note 114, at 1. (“The IT-BPO sector has
become one of the most significant growth catalysts for the Indian economy. In
addition to fuelling India’s economy, this industry is also positively influencing
the lives of its people through an active direct and indirect contribution to the
various socio-economic parameters such as employment, standard of living and
diversity among others. The industry has played a significant role in
transforming India’s image from a slow moving bureaucratic economy to a land
of innovative entrepreneurs and a global player in providing world class
technology solutions and business services. The industry has helped India
transform from a rural and agriculture-based economy to a knowledge based
economy.”)
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Cabinet Minister.220 The industry is also considerably well organized
through NASSCOM and other associations, and has consistently spoken
up when affected by laws in India or the United States.221 However, no
Indian firm endorsed the software patent bill, nor did any firm protest
Parliament’s decision to reject the proposed amendment. There is also no
record of lobbying or support from NASSCOM or any other industrylevel body.222
Tellingly, the software industry remained silent even when the
Indian Patent Office gave retrospective effect to Parliament’s action. The
Indian Patent Office declared not only that it would not grant software
patents in the future (as per Parliament’s pronouncement), but also went
several steps further. The government passed an ordinance providing for
software patents in December 2004 (Ordinance), and the Ordinance was
in effect until April 2005 when the legislature rejected the proposal. The
Indian Patent Office declared patents granted when the Ordinance was in
effect were invalid not only in the future, but also during the four-month
period when the Ordinance had been the law in India.223 The Indian
Patent Office evidently believes this move will not be viewed
unfavorably by the courts even though, as a general rule, Indian courts
disapprove of laws providing retrospective effect—even when passed by
the Legislature, let alone by administrative bodies. Arguably, a nudge
from the popular software industry would have tipped the scales against
retrospective application because the Ministry for Industry in India had
proposed software patents of its own accord.224 Further, software firms
could have argued the proposal was only a “small additional step”—even
independent of this draft legislation, software patents are granted for
220

Vikas Bajaj, India Undertakes Ambitious ID Card Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 25,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/world/asia/26india.html?ref=nanda
nmnilekani. See also About UIDAI, UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY OF
INDIA, http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141
&Itemid=164 (last visited, Feb. 1, 2011) (“Shri. Nandan M. Nilekani as
Chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India, in the rank and status
of a Cabinet Minister for an initial tenure of five years. Mr. Nilekani has joined
the UIDAI as its Chairman on 23 July 2009.”)
221
Id.
222
See supra Part II.B for NASSCOM’s discussion on the need to build Brand
India and the contrasting disinterest to secure additional IP protection.
223
The patents that were granted in the period between the promulgation of the
Ordinance and the subsequent Amendments (between December 2004 and
March 2005) were reversed by the Patent Office. See Software Patents Under
Ordinance Face Reversal, FIN. EXPRESS (NEW DELHI) (Mar. 29, 2005),
http://www.financialexpress.com/fe_full_story.php?content_id=86454.
224
See discussion supra Part II.A.1 on NASSCOM and Indian IT firms’
lobbying efforts on the face of regulations that have impacted the industry.
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practical application or technical effect, and so, providing patent
protection for software per se would only be a small additional step.225
The software patent applications filed for practical application or
technical effect present additional means to check for industry response
to patents. Curiously, individuals rather than corporations filed the
majority of applications, and applications were filed much more often by
foreign firms than by Indian software firms.226 Of the 150 patents granted
for “technical application of software,” even prior to the Ordinance, nonsoftware MNCs like LG, Nokia, Philips, and Samsung had filed a vast
majority, while Indian software firms had filed comparatively few.
The story so far demonstrates the strong growth of the Indian
software industry has been unaffected by an increase or decrease in
patent safeguards. By the same token, industry does not appear to make
any attempt to secure patents, signaling how little IP protection matters
to industry. The industry’s reaction is unsurprising given the costs
patents create. Patents impose a licensing tier and increase costs and
litigation risks (in turn, creating business uncertainties).227 Not only are
patents unnecessary for software, but they also have several adverse
effects.

225

It cannot be argued that software firms do not lobby for patent protection
because they in effect obtain patents utilizing this indirect provision. Multinational corporations, U.S. firms, and electronic firms—rather Indian software
firms—filed and secured the vast majority of software patents in India. See
Patenting in Electronics, INTELLECTUAL PROP. RTS., Apr. 2000, at 4, available
at http://www.indianpatents.org.in/fac/april2k.pdf.
226
The Patent Facility Centre (PFC) study revealed that patent fees for filings by
individuals (approximately $20–25 or 1000) were lower than the fees for
corporate filings ($100–125 or 5000). See Individuals Dominate Patent Filing,
HINDU BUS. LINE, Nov. 6, 2002, available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.i
n/2002/11/06/stories/2002110602690100.htm.
227
See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1441–42 (arguing the rights proliferation has
created additional problems that are magnified in the knowledge economy).
Dreyfuss argued that with the “product-to-right ratio” changed, products are
associated with more than one IP right. Id. at 1442 (“For example, bringing a
video game to market can require licenses to copyrights, trademarks, celebrity
images—and to hundreds of patented software subroutines. In that environment,
costs multiply and hold-outs become increasingly likely.”). Dreyfuss also argued
that patents being moved “upstream” to cover a broad swath of inventive
opportunities has resulted in potential inefficiencies. (It is unclear whether rights
holders have the capacity to fully mine their claims). Id. See also LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE, supra note 1, at 102–114 (discussing how innovators and business
would be constrained “by the massive threat of liability tied to the murky
boundaries of copyright law.”).
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To sum up, this Part confirms that industry does not rely on IP
protection for growth. First, periods of high growth appear unrelated to
increases in IP protection.228 Second, copyright protection and IP rights
in India are weak, and have remained so throughout the period of
interest. Third, the industry, which is the principal intended beneficiary
of software patents, does not endorse the patent proposal. Finally, on the
basis of tacit arrangements in the industry in the United States229 and
India, we are left with the question of whether it is strong IP protection
the industry really needs.
The commercial software industry in India provides the first
proof of “IP without IP.” Indeed, we have clear corroboration that the
traditional law and economics prescription—more property rights will
result in more growth—does not work in the software industry. This case
study provides the evidence that U.S. Congress and judges look for in
order to limit copyright expansions. The study of the commercial
software industry in India demonstrates profits alone are sufficient
incentive for software production and relieves scholars of any enquiry
into the motivations of software programmers, unlike the Internet
Studies. In addition, this commercial industry data cannot be easily
dismissed by the property intuition that prevents the open software
experience from placing limits on copyright expansions. Once we
comprehend that the software industry does not rely on, or even appear
concerned with, formal IP rights, we are no longer surprised that
individual programmers are putting up code for free. Hence, this Part
fills a critical gap in American literature and leads us into Part III.

III.

A “SECOND GIFT” FROM THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Several leading American scholars have put forward several
other theories to explain the factors contributing to the growth of the U.S.
software industry. For instance, Professors Ronald Mann and Ronald
Gilson have endorsed, alternate legal theories for the growth of the
software industry.230 One concern with these studies is, absent
corroboration, scholars run the risk of mistaking correlation with
228

See infra Figure 1; see discussion infra Parts II.A.1, 2.
Mann, for instance, documents how there is tacit agreement in the software
industry in the United States that enables firms to access each other’s IP without
the threat of litigation. See Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software,
supra note 16, at 10.
230
As spelt out in the Introduction, copyright and patent are already available for
software in the United States. Therefore, evidence that the software industry
would have flourished in the United States even without copyright or patent is
very difficult to obtain. It is particularly noteworthy that, in spite of these
limitations, Professors Mann and Gilson question the connection between IP
protection and the software industry, which shall be discussed in this Part.
229
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causality. Causation may be incorrectly attributed to a condition, which
is in fact merely a feature of the industry (or co-incidence or outcome).
The Indian data steps in here to provide another gift—a site to doublecheck whether a condition featured in these U.S. studies is merely a
coincidental attribute or causal factor for industry to thrive. In sum, the
analysis in this Part will provide American legal scholarship with a vital
contribution: it will prevent scholars from disproving IP causation on the
one hand, and, on the other, from substituting it with another equally
incorrect causal theory (or second-order errors).
Ronald Mann’s and Ronald Gilson’s studies, which employ
contrasting methodologies, both contribute to a richer analysis in this
Part. Ronald Mann’s empirical study focuses on whether venture
capitalists in the industry depend upon copyright or patent protections in
making investment decisions.231 Ronald Gilson, in contrast, opts for a
comparative-experimental examination of which laws enabled the
software industry to mushroom in the Silicon Valley yet atrophy in
Massachusetts.232 The Indian data support the following findings made
by the Mann and Gilson studies on the software industry. (a) The
industry does not rely on formal IP rights. (b) Instead, industry depends
upon know-how or tacit knowledge, which are the skills and expertise
employees acquire through experience rather than codifiable
information.233 The comparative data enables us to check for false
causation when we propose alternate causal stories (or second-order
errors).
In place of IP laws, Mann and Gilson argue for alternate causal
theories to explain the growth of the software industry. The data,
however, dispute the alternative causal stories that Mann and Gilson
provide. Mann argues copyright is important in two scenarios: (a) to
prevent piracy from later-stage firms and (b) to prevent “theft” by
outgoing employees. On that basis, he argues that, overall, copyright is
vital for the industry.234 The data from leading software firms in the welldeveloped Indian industry rebuts this conclusion. As part of their
standard business contracts, the top Indian software firms assign full IP
rights to U.S. clients. Clearly, the large Indian software firms have
surpassed the initial, start-up phases and can be characterized as later231

Mann, Commercializing Open Source Software, supra note 16, at 1–4.
Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 575–78.
233
Id. at 577 n.10. Gilson defines tacit knowledge in this manner. I retain this
definition for this Article, which provides the necessary definitional agreement
for the analysis. Mann also relies on a similar definition—tacit knowledge is
knowledge “which is difficult to verify or transfer.” Mann, Financing, supra
note 18, at 992.
234
Id. at 1012.
232
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stage firms. If IP is vital for later-stage firms to develop further, then
why would Indian firms be willing to assign all IP rights? This practice
of assigning IP rights to the clients weakens the contention that IP is
important for later-stage firms to develop further.235 Moreover, the Indian
data indicate software firms have created conditions that are most
conducive to free migration of personnel between firms.236 No copyright
infringement action has been brought against any ex-employee, and there
is no concern over “theft” by outgoing employees.237 The evidence
contradicts any suggestion that software firms use copyright to police
departing employees and their activity.
Gilson, in contrast, pinpoints causation in a California statute
because the software industry flourishes in California’s Silicon Valley as
opposed to Massachusetts’s Route 128 region.238 Gilson attributes
Silicon Valley’s success to California law, which does not enforce postemployment covenants not to compete.239 However, the Indian data do
not support the conclusion that this California law is a causal determinant
of where industry flourishes. India displays near-identical geographical
concentration and development. As in the Silicon Valley-Route 128 saga,
Bangalore raced past Mumbai, where the industry first started.240 But
235

See infra Conclusion.
Id. (discussing how software firms reimburse new hires for payments in lieu
of notice period paid to ex-employers. This suggests industry values transfer of
know-how through employee mobility rather than formal IP.).
237
See, e.g., Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 1018.
238
Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 577, 578 (choosing, as
the context of his “analysis[,] the juxtaposition of two familiar U.S. high
technology industrial districts: Silicon Valley on the San Francisco peninsula
and Route 128 outside of Boston” to tap into Annalee Saxenian’s study and
benefit from the “natural experiment to test competing explanations for the two
districts’ differential performance.”).
239
Id. at 578. The American software industry appears to be spatially
concentrated in specific areas, referred to as “industrial districts” or “geographic
concentration.” Firms benefit from “agglomeration economies” or input needed
for production, such as labor in this case is “available more cheaply within the
region because of the spatial concentration of users. Marshall used the labor
market as an example of the increasing returns phenomenon. As more firms in
an industry locate in a region, workers with the skills demanded by the industry
follow. The process is self-reinforcing: as more skilled workers locate in a
region, other firms in the industry follow. The geographic concentration of firms
result in a lower cost of skilled labor.” Id. at 576 (citations omitted). See also id.
for a discussion on geographical clustering, which results in industrial districts
and high technology districts in particular.
240
Mumbai had an enormous head start and was the largest software producer in
India in the 1960s. In fact, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) was established at
the Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing Zone in Mumbai in 1968. TCS
236
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there are no differences in the law of the two industrial districts in India
with regard to the legal protection of postemployment covenants. Both
districts are governed by the same federal law in India. Section 27 of the
Indian Contract Act of 1872 renders post-employment covenants not to
compete void.241 The geographical spread of the industry in India
had a huge advantage as it was a part of the Tata Group, which was India’s
largest firm and accounted for 2.7 percent of the national GDP in 2007. Mumbai
has, however, receded as the hub of India’s software industry. Bangalore and
other southern cities entered the software industry well after Mumbai, but have
displaced Mumbai, which is now ranked seventh. Today, Bangalore not only
accounts for over one-third of India’s software industry and software exports,
but TCS and other Mumbai firms have relocated significant operations and
offices to Bangalore. For more details about Bangalore’s software industry, see
infra Conclusion. See also SAXENIAN, THE NEW ARGONAUTS, supra note 122, at
277–78 for the origins of the Indian software industry, the establishment of TCS
in Mumbai, and general industry history; Soutik Biswas, Tata – Integral Part of
Indian Life, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 31, 2007, 12:11 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south_asia/6316275.stm; Information Technology in India: Top 10 IT Hubs
in India, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_technology_in_I
ndia - Top_Eight_IT_Hubs_in_India (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
241
The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“27. Agreement in restraint of trade void.
Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful
profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void. Exception 1.
Saving of agreement not to carry on business of which goodwill is sold. - One
who sells the goodwill of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from
carrying on a similar business, within specified local limits, so long as the buyer,
or any person deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business
therein: Provided that such limits appear to the court reasonable, regard being
had to the nature of the business.”). The Supreme Court of India disfavors postemployment covenants not to compete, and consistently upholds any restrictions
after the term of contract as a “restraint of trade” that is void, and provides strict
construction of the exception provided by the proviso to Sec. 27. See e.g.,
Percept D’ Mark (India) (P) Ltd. v. Zaheer Khan (2006) 4 SCC 227, ¶ 56 (“The
legal position with regard to post-contractual covenants or restrictions has been
consistent, unchanging and completely settled in our country,” citing the 132years-old interpretation laid down in Madhup Chander v. Rajcoomar Doss,
(1874) 14 Beng LR 76). See also id. at ¶ 63 (“[U]nder Section 27 of the Contract
Act: (a) a restrictive covenant extending beyond the term of the contract is void
and not enforceable, (b) the doctrine of restraint of trade does not apply during
the continuance of the contract for employment and it applies only when the
contract comes to an end, (c) as held by this court in Gujarat Bottling v. CocaCola this doctrine is not confined only to contracts of employment, but is also
applicable to all other contracts.”). Article 141 of the Indian Constitution
provides that the decisions of the Supreme Court are binding precedent on all
other Indian courts. INDIA CONST. art. 141. This law, therefore, is uniformly
applied throughout India, with no inter-state differences. See e.g., Jet Airways
(I) Ltd. v. Jan Peter Ravi Karnik, MANU/MH/0434/2000, where the High Court

No. 1]

“LESS IS MORE”: NEW PROPERTY PARADIGM

131

unrelated to the legal protection provided by postemployment covenants
runs counter to Gilson’s causal story.
Parts III.A and III.B below will discuss the Mann and Gilson
studies and how the facts and figures from India ensure scholars do not
get trapped in false causation or commit second-order errors. In other
words, we do not disprove the connection between IP protection and
software industry growth only to then fall prey to second-order errors of
attributing causation to another equally unrelated law.

A. Intellectual Property – A Non-Determinant for Investment
Ronald Mann’s empirical study on how venture capitalists make
investment decisions reveals that venture capitalists place little or no
reliance on copyright or patent protection when making those
decisions.242 Mann’s study affirms that, if they are considered at all, IP
rights are of very low priority in determining a venture capitalist’s
investment decision.243 The Indian software industry supports and
supplements these findings.
First, as explained in Part II, the data from India show IP is far
less important for industry to prosper than previously surmised.
of Bombay refused to enforce postemployment restrictions. (In this case, airline
employment contracts prevented pilots who had received assisted training from
taking up employment with competitors. This was struck down as void on the
basis that Indian law does not permit any negative covenants in the post contract
period.). See id. ¶ 7. No software firm has filed any suit so far in any court in
India to enforce any postemployment covenants. Given the law, and the courts’
view in many industries and services including airlines, it is extremely unlikely
that the courts will view the software industry differently (and be willing to
carve out any additional exception to the statute merely for one industry). IT
should be noted that this decision is by the High Court of Bombay (or Mumbai,
where the Indian software industry first germinated, which is compared to Route
128 in the United States in this Article).
242
Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 976. Mann’s study demonstrates patents
alone do not factor into the decision to invest. Instead, if patents are considered,
they are viewed as a signal for the uniqueness and market potential of the
products.
243
Id. at 980–81 (citation omitted). Mann’s study avers venture capitalists attach
far more importance to other factors in making investment decisions. Id. at 976,
980–81 (citation omitted). Investors focused on “sustainable differentiation,”
and examined various attributes of the company as indirect predictors for its
success. Different investors had differing views on patents. Overall, there was
mixed reliance on patents. In the limited situations when venture capitalists do
rely on patents, “[t]he most likely explanation is that investors are simply
implementing different investment models based on their particular expertise.
Id. at 976–78. Therefore, the overall finding remained unchanged. For a
discussion on foreign investment in Bangalore, see Lateef, supra note 132, ch. 4.
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According to standard law and economics views of property, scholars
would expect that IP’s monopoly grant enables the technology firm to
attract investment.244 Mann’s study reflects different results on the
ground. When deciding in which of a small number of firms she should
invest (usually about 6 out of 1,000), a venture capitalist focuses on “the
firm’s competency to execute its concept successfully” or market
experience and management’s skills.245 The venture capitalist cares about
the firm’s “sustainable differentiation,” or whether the firm can do
something its competitors cannot achieve in the future.246 With regard to
IP, Mann’s analysis reveals (a) “IP protection is important only
indirectly”247 and (b) investors do not universally value IP.248 Various
investors weigh in on IP protection differently, which Mann hypothesizes
is the result of investors “implementing different investment models
based on their particular expertise.”249 The point remains that IP rights
count for far less with investors than assumed earlier. (c) Even among
the investors who look for IP protection, they are more interested in the
“technology that is sufficiently cutting edge to warrant protection.”250
Second, reading the Indian information in conjunction with
Mann’s findings helps resolve the law and economics theory in toto. Law
and economics scholars argue property rights will result in growth, and a
more recent strain in scholarship posits property rights are necessary to
encourage investment. Mann’s data from the United States clearly
dispute the latter prong,251 and the Indian industry disproves the former
prong.252 The Indian industry data supplements Mann’s analysis here.
244

Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 975.
Id. at 975–76.
246
Id. at 976.
247
Id. Investors care most about the expectation of market power, and ownership
of IP is valued only as one of the many attributes that may indirectly predict
market power.
248
Id. at 977–78 (discussing investors’ varying attitudes toward IP protection).
249
Id. at 978.
250
Id. at 977.
251
Mann’s study demonstrates venture capitalists do not place much importance
on IP rights, from which one might extrapolate investors generally, not just
venture capitalists, do not place much weight on IP protection because “most
important innovations in the software industry come from relatively small
firms,” which “typically are venture backed.” Id. at 973 (citation omitted).
Ronald Mann and Thomas Sager’s empirical study on venture capital investment
in the software industry provides additional corroboration. See Ronald J. Mann
& Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-ups, 36 RES.
POL’Y 193, 194 (2007) (“Patent acquisition (or application) at the time of initial
investment is largely irrelevant to the firm’s subsequent progress through the
venture capital cycle, measured by any metric.”). The paper acknowledges,
245
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Third, the Indian industry’s actual business contracts reflect
Mann’s intuition. Mann suggests tacit knowledge may be far more
valuable for software firms than previously surmised (and IP law’s main
benefit for industry may be in codifying this tacit knowledge).253 The
conduct of Indian software firms affirms Mann’s assertion, and the
business contracts go a step further. The business contracts that Indian
firms enter into with clients in the United States (and elsewhere) show,
on the one hand, the Indian firm has no qualms in transferring full IP
rights to the client while, on the other, it protects against transfer of
know-how by not permitting employee hiring.254 In the contract with the
client, the Indian firm insists on including a clause imposing a penalty or
a punitive damages amount if a client hires away the Indian firm’s
employees.255 Indian firms thus avoid transfer of know-how or tacit
knowledge, signaling what truly matters to the firm.
The Indian industry data supplements Mann’s study but refutes
Mann’s conclusion. In spite of the novel data that Mann unearths,
dissolving IP-software causation, Mann concludes “copyright plays a
crucial role in the industry’s ability to appropriate returns from the
innovation it produces.”256 He bases his conclusion on two reasons.
Although IP protection does not encourage investment, it fulfills two
narrow purposes: (a) preventing piracy—it is easier to prove copyright
infringement rather than patent infringement because copyright has a
lower standard of originality than the high standard required to establish
patentability;257 and (b) preventing code theft by departing employees—
however, that there may be situations in which IP is relevant: (a) later stages of
development post-venture capital financing, and (b) in certain types of software
development. Id. at 194, 199. Still, Mann and Sager’s study does not detract
from the overall point of this Article—that evidence from the Indian software
industry does not support the automatic presumption that growth requires
stronger IP protection.
252
See supra Part II.
253
See Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 992.
254
See Interview with Management, supra note 112.
255
Id. For a discussion on how Indian firms persuade U.S. firms to agree to this
term, see the discussion of an “arm’s distance” agreement, infra note 290.
256
Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 1015.
257
Id. at 1017 (“For example, even if pirated software is protected in part by a
patent, a suit against the pirate challenging patent infringement necessarily is
more difficult because of the need for the software owner to establish the
patent’s validity. Because of the relatively high standard of patentability—
compared to the copyright standard of originality—it always will be difficult for
the patent owner to get over the threshold of patentability. Because of the low
threshold of copyrightability, it never will be difficult for the owner of
copyrighted software to establish that the software includes copyrightable
innovation.”). Mann also defends copyright on the basis that “[s]tatistics from
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because of the litigation costs and uncertainty associated with patent
litigation, firms find it easier to utilize copyright infringement claims
rather than patent claims in order to prevent employees from reusing a
substantial portion of code produced while at their previous firms.258
There are intrinsic defects in Mann’s argument—both prongs are
based on defects in the patent system, the goals of which differ from
those of copyright. With regard to the “preventing piracy” rationale
Mann puts forward, higher standards of patentability are features of the
patent system, which cannot be the basis to justify copyright.259 With
regard to the “code theft” argument, again, the purpose of copyright is
not to correct any problem in patent enforcement. Simply stated, the
Framers of the Constitution did not intend Congress to legislate on
copyright with the purpose of plugging gaps in patent systems.260 Still,
scholars would require extrinsic proof that copyright does not support
industry in other ways (similar to the confirmation we needed to curtail
copyright’s expansions).
The analysis of Indian industry in Part II comes to the rescue
here. The comparative study dissolved the presumption that industry
needs IP rights to flourish, and distinguished causal from coincidental
factors in the U.S. software industry. Mann identifies a few
the Department of Justice suggest that the federal government often sues pirates
for criminal copyright infringement; there is not a statute for criminal patent
infringement.” Id. As noted earlier, these are system characteristics, which may
arguably make the case for internal reform but not a deontic justification for
copyright. This objection eliminates any remaining argument that seeks to
justify copyright on the basis that it fills gaps in patent law.
258
Id. at 1018.
259
Mann alludes to this idea to some extent when he admits these characteristics
are “structural.” Id. at 1015. They are features of the patent system rather than
copyright justifications. Moreover, there are internal inconsistencies in the
piracy justification. On the one hand, Mann argues that copyright is the only
effective protection against piracy, but on the other, he documents piracy losses,
particularly in the consumer software sector, and the enterprise software sector
in other countries. He even relies on studies that document a piracy rate of over
22% in consumer software in the United States, suggesting copyright protection
is not an effective means of preventing piracy. Furthermore, it does not provide
any justification for copyright protection in the first place. See id. at 1015–17.
260
See supra Part I.A for a brief synopsis of the goals the Framers of the
Constitution intended to achieve. It is also questionable whether we would like
copyright to be deployed to resolve issues with departing employees. Mann
distinguishes the piracy problem from the departing employees problem in part
by emphasizing the actors in the piracy problem are consumers rather than
employees or other software companies, which in turn raises other concerns. I
thank the editors of this Journal for pointing out this distinction.
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circumstances in which patents are useful for firms.261 Given that
copyright and patent protections are available for software in the United
States, it is unsurprising that firms or investors occasionally rely on them
(or some firms pursue a business strategy that is based upon IP rights).
Still, to base causation on the fact that a small number of firms do file for
patents or copyright and argue for wide property protection is a stretch.
Without the comparative information, we are unable to truly decide
whether or not industry is prospering because of these benefits.262 This
comparative study helps prevent imputing causation to IP because it
already exists (or is a “historic outcome”).

B. The Value of Know-How
Ronald Gilson constructs an elegant hypothesis based on
observations of U.S. industry, particularly the relative ascendance of
Silicon Valley (over Route 128 in Massachusetts). He uses Annalee
Saxenian’s experimental study, which uncovered that, although
Massachusetts’s Route 128 initially led California’s Silicon Valley,
Silicon Valley eventually overtook Route 128 in productivity.263 Gilson
theorizes the law enabling free transfer of employees between firms is
the reason Silicon Valley continues to thrive; also, it is the causal
condition for a software industry to succeed.264 Gilson’s theory appears
plausible, but is easy to deny absent supporting evidence.
India’s software industry steps in to bridge this gap, and provides
an apt site to test Gilson’s thesis, particularly because India’s software
industry too developed along industrial district lines. Like the
geographical clustering in Silicon Valley, the industry in India is

261

Mann argues, as a general rule, pre-revenue startups find it difficult to obtain
any value from patents. In fact, obtaining patents often diverts the firm’s focus
from successfully building the product and business. If, however, firms survive
that phase and become larger, some indirect benefits such as information gains
emerge. Mann, Financing, supra note 18, at 961–62.
262
Id. at 962. (“The central question, which I do not attempt to answer here, is
whether those benefits are sufficiently substantial to justify the costs of
obtaining the patents.”).
263
Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 577–78. Saxenian is
content to attribute Silicon Valley’s success to the differences in “business
culture” between the two regions. Gilson, however, argues that the legal
infrastructure created the business culture in California in the first place and that
the legal infrastructure is therefore the root cause of Silicon Valley’s continued
success.
264
Gilson makes this argument in the context of “high technology districts.” I
use “software industry” instead in this Article. For easy reading, I have opted for
uniformity and this substitution does not affect our analysis.
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concentrated in Bangalore.265 Moreover, a central part of Gilson’s thesis
is built on Silicon Valley’s history of surging ahead of Route 128.266
Here too, the industrial districts in India mirror those in the United States
and were involved in a near-identical race. The industrial district
Bangalore surged ahead of Mumbai even though Mumbai (like Route
128) was the original leader in software exports in the 1960s. For these
reasons, India offers a particularly appropriate site to test and gather
proof for Gilson’s elegant theory, if it is correct.
The Indian evidence verifies and proves Gilson’s analysis, and
simultaneously disproves the conclusion. First, based on the comparative
study of Silicon Valley and Massachusetts, Gilson disproves IP as the
causal explanation for industry growth. “[T]he success of Silicon Valley
firms suggests that per capita firm value will be greater where
intellectual property protection is somewhat diluted, in contrast to the
traditional law and economics prescription that emphasizes full
protection of intellectual property.”267 IP is governed by U.S. federal law,
265

Bangalore’s industrial district alone accounts for one third of India’s total
software industry and the highest software exports from India. Wipro and
Infosys, the second and third largest Indian software firms are headquartered in
Bangalore. Many top U.S. and other international software firms (such as
Google, IBM, Yahoo!, Oracle Corporation, and others), as well as other Indian
software firms (TCS, iGate, and others), maintain significant offices in
Bangalore. In less than two decades, Bangalore was transformed from a
pensioner’s paradise into the software industry hub. In 1992, the first
information technology park was set up in Bangalore, and the U.S.-based Texas
Instruments set up the first “offshore” software production and laid the physical
cables for the Internet. The software industry quickly germinated and built on
the prior presence of the electronics park, known as the Karnataka State
Electronics Department, which was established in 1976. Bangalore’s three
clusters, the Software Technology parks of India, International Tech Park, and
Electronics City now account for the vast majority of India’s software output.
See James Heitzmann, Becoming Silicon Valley, 503 SEMINAR (2001), available
at http://www.india-seminar.com/2001/503/503 james heitzman.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2011).
266
See Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 586–87 (providing
economic data measuring how, in 1965, Route 128 started well ahead and
employed nearly three times the number that Silicon Valley did. But by 1994,
Silicon Valley had surged ahead of Route 128, creating new employment several
times over and emerging as the top software-exporting district. Meanwhile,
Route 128 dropped out of the top five software-exporting districts in the United
States.).
267
Id. at 575. For a detailed discussion, see id. at 620–26. Note that Gilson does
not argue where industry will first be set up, but rather which industrial districts
will continue to develop and be sustainable in the long term. He argues that less
IP protection is critical for long-term success of the district’s development. This
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and both California and Massachusetts share the same initial conditions
for establishing the industry. IP law, however, fails to explain why
Silicon Valley surged ahead, while Route 128 deteriorated. The natural
experiment in India supports and corroborates Gilson’s thesis268 —Indian
firms’ growth was independent of IP laws.269 They did not seek IP
protection in India or abroad and have no qualms about transferring full
IP rights to clients.270 Formal IP rights are not as central for the software
industry to thrive as imagined.
Second, for a software industry to endure in any industrial
district, free inter-firm transfer of know-how or “tacit knowledge”271 is
needed. Gilson (using Saxenian’s study) argues that in Silicon Valley
(unlike in Massachusetts), engineers and other employees constantly
shifted between firms. When employees moved, they carried the
employer’s know-how with them to the new firm, and created
“knowledge spillovers.”272 Knowledge spillovers in turn were critical in
resetting an industrial district’s production life cycle.273 In short,
“knowledge spillovers facilitated by the mobility of employees . . . turn
the entire industrial district into an engine of continuous innovation,
thereby transcending the life cycle of any single product.”274 Route 128,
in contrast, had no such culture of job-hopping and employee mobility.
Gilson explains why knowledge spillovers are important for the software
industry to succeed in the long term. (a) High technology industrial
districts such as Silicon Valley and Route 128 follow a cyclical

argument does not affect the central thesis of this Article, but is included here
for completeness. Also, Gilson clearly knocks out “intellectual property” as a
causal factor as discussed. In doing so, he takes the much harder path of
establishing how “tacit knowledge,” or how to implement the data rather than
the codifiable information, is the critical linchpin.
268
Gilson does look for empirical proof supporting his thesis that IP is not so
central, or “causal empiricism” as he calls it. As explained earlier, such evidence
of “IP without IP” cannot be gathered in the United States since it already
provides IP cover for software. But in order to support his thesis, Gilson
produces one example—if firms needed full IP protection, then Novartis would
not have set up its new research center in California, whose enabling knowledge
spillover dilutes IP, according to Gilson. Id. at 622. Instead of requiring us to
deduce a conclusion on the basis of one example or the counterfactual, the
Indian industry comes to Gilson’s assistance and provides clear experimental
proof.
269
See supra Part II.
270
Id.
271
See supra Part III.
272
Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 585.
273
Id. at 591.
274
Id.
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development path.275 (b) Once a product matures, the advantage in
clustering around knowledge centers vanishes and the district diffuses,
which is what happened with Route 128.276 (c) A district will, however,
continue to innovate and become self-sustaining as Silicon Valley did, if
it is able to develop “new products that will reset the industry life
cycle.”277
Gilson’s argument in favor of spillovers requires proof,
especially because it militates against the prevailing law and economics
prescription for more property protection. Bangalore provides evidence
that confirms Gilson’s intuition and reveals an industry business practice
that enhances employee movement even more than the trends unearthed
in Silicon Valley. As in Silicon Valley, the software engineers and
employees in Bangalore freely switch between firms and may even work
for former competitors. The region is characterized by “high velocity
employment,” as Professor Alan Hyde terms it.278 Interestingly, Indian
software firms reimburse new hires for any payment they may have
made in lieu of providing the proper notice period to their prior
employers.279 This hiring practice by firms vastly enhances inter-firm
movement and is a step over and above the “culture of mobility”
Saxenian documents in Silicon Valley.280 In other words, if Silicon
Valley “allows” employee movement, Bangalore actively “enables”
employee movement.
Third, the “legal rules governing employee mobility” are the
causal antecedent for creating cultures that supported free inter-firm
knowledge transfer, which led to Silicon Valley’s success.281 In
particular, Gilson attributes Silicon Valley’s continued success to
California’s Business and Professions Code Section 16600, which
disallows post-employment covenants not to compete.282 In short, based
275

Id. at 585.
Id.
277
Id.
278
Id. at 591.
279
See Interview with Management, supra note 112. This “buying-out the old
employment contract” practice used to be an extremely common, almost
standard, industry-wide practice in India. Since the 2008 global financial crisis,
it has become less common. Firms now ask that new hires negotiate out of their
notice period with past employers. But the practice continues, even if in
somewhat reduced numbers. Notably, the senior manager of a top-five software
firm in India indicated this practice continues when the firm wants the new hire
to work on a project that is set to commence immediately.
280
SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE, supra note 36, at 111–17. See also
Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 578.
281
Id. at 578.
282
Id. at 607–609.
276
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on the relative performance of Silicon Valley, Gilson locates causation in
a California state law. The business agreements of software firms in
India validate Gilson’s analysis that industry values free inter-firm
knowledge transfer, particularly of tacit knowledge. But it discredits the
conclusion that the state law on post-employment restrictions is
responsible for the industry’s long-term success.
As discussed earlier, the industry in India closely mirrors the
U.S. industry in two respects. First, the formation of industrial districts in
India closely resembles that in the United States. This clustering in both
the U.S. and India suggests agglomeration may be an industry trait.283
Second, one industrial district in India, Bangalore, surged ahead of
Mumbai even though Mumbai was the leader in software exports in the
1960s (just like Silicon Valley superseded Route 128).284 However, there
is no difference in the law on point—Bangalore and Mumbai share the
same law with regard to post-employment restrictions.285 This
observation disputes Gilson’s conclusion that the law on post283

See Arora & Gambardella, supra note 134 (drawing interesting parallels with
similar clustering in other industries like tire manufacturing).
284
See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
285
As a general rule, postemployment restrictions are not enforceable in India.
Moreover, Indian courts do not view postemployment covenants favorably,
other than in exceptional circumstances. Even here, the courts interpret
restrictions narrowly. For the legal provision that renders postemployment
covenants illegal and the case law, see supra note 241. The law on point is well
established by the Supreme Court of India, equally binding on all courts and is
applied nationwide. Because of the structure of the courts in India, the decisions
have a wider and uniform reach. Even though India, like the United States, is a
federation with separate executive and legislative bodies at the state and federal
level, there is a unitary court system. The high courts of each state report to the
Supreme Court of India. In other words, India does not separate its courts into
federal and state courts. With regard to software, the industry in Bangalore raced
ahead of its Mumbai counterpart, even though both districts treated
postemployment restrictions identically. Several alternate reasons have been
articulated to explain why Bangalore emerged as the center of the software
industry in India, especially as Bangalore’s meteoric rise was propelled by
software rather than traditional industry. These reasons range from the existence
of the closely related electronics sector to forward and backward linkages with
aeronautics and defense sensitive industries in Bangalore because Bangalore
was strategically placed away from the borders. Similarly, the emergence of the
industry in south India was attributed to the higher number of engineering
colleges, the English-speaking workforce, and others such reasons. See Lateef,
supra note 132, chs. 2, 4, 5. A complete analysis of Bangalore is beyond the
scope of this Article. For the purpose of this Article, it is sufficient to
demonstrate that the software industry in India displays near identical
geographical agglomeration as the industry in the United States.
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employment restrictions is the primary factor in the growth of the
software industry. The Indian data suggests post-employment restrictions
may perhaps be a necessary factor but is not sufficient to determine
industry longevity. Sorting through various factors and identifying the
precise factors for the industry’s success in Bangalore is left for future
work. In the present Article, fostering an understanding of Indian
industry data ensures that scholars will not fall prey to false causation. It
prevents the substitution of one causal story (IP in this case) with another
law (post-employment restrictions), which is equally incorrect.
Another aspect Gilson touches upon in passing is how tacit
knowledge or know-how is more valuable to the industry than formal
information, which IP law seeks to protect. Earlier, firms in knowledgebased industries preferred proximity in space (or geographic proximity)
to benefit from the associated economies.286 But with the Internet
enabling instantaneous communication, the need for physical proximity
has been dissolved.287 “From this perspective, the effect of technology
should be to eliminate” geographical clustering.288 Instead, the software
industry displays the opposite behavior and Gilson explains this
contradiction. “The puzzle disappears when one distinguishes between
information on the one hand and knowledge or know-how on the other.
The distinction is in the tacit character of knowledge—not the formal
conception of an innovation, but the skill and experience associated with
effectively creating, developing, and implementing it.”289 Business
agreements entered into by Indian software firms with U.S. clients reveal
surprising proof supporting Gilson’s intuition. In contracts with clients in
the United States and elsewhere, Indian firms specify the client cannot
hire the Indian firm’s employees.290 Indian firms insist upon this
286

For a discussion on knowledge yielding increasing returns as a result of
geographic proximity, see Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at
581–82.
287
Id. at 582 (“Precisely because of high technology, information has lost its
geographic anchor. For example, the physical location of a law library is
unimportant when the case reports are available electronically through Lexis and
Westlaw.”).
288
Gilson in fact argues “[t]he more important knowledge is as an input, the less
likely we should be to observe industrial clustering.” Id.
289
Id. (“Although advances in information technology may have caused the cost
of transmitting the formal conception to become invariant to distance,
effectively transmitted tacit knowledge requires proximity, and hence, creates
the potential for agglomeration economies.”).
290
A senior management official of a top Indian software firm called it an
“arm’s distance” agreement. In other words, Indian firms offer a two-way clause
whereby the U.S. client and Indian firm agree not to poach each other’s staff.
During negotiations, the clause is explained as providing gains to the U.S. firm
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contractual term, and to discourage such hiring-away, they impose a
punitive damage penalty if any client defaults on this covenant.291 The
Indian firm, however, has no qualms about assigning formal IP rights to
the client.292 The business contracts thus speak volumes on what the
Indian software firms prize most.
Interestingly, the Indian data hits the precise sweet spot to which
Gilson alludes. Gilson argues the only two ways in which this valuable
knowledge transfer can occur are either through a market relationship
(transmission of technological know-how by contract with a supplier) or
through the movement of workers between employers.293 Both these
prongs are animated in Indian software firms—they restrict the transfer
of tacit knowledge via a market relationship (i.e., by prohibiting the
hiring of employees from the Indian firm or its supplier).
The analysis here suggests tacit knowledge or know-how is far
more important for the software industry than the formal information that
is codified and protected under copyright or patent law. The inquiry in
this Part, along with that in Part II (which established how the industry
does not rely on IP protection), provides a more textured understanding
of the software industry and the nature of knowledge that drives
innovation.

CONCLUSION: A CAUSAL EXPLANATION BEYOND “HISTORIC
ACCIDENT”
We witness a battle on the technology front as Apple and
Samsung sue each other for IP infringement in a bid for market

and prevents any conflicts in the future. For instance, if the Indian firm were to
hire the U.S. client’s employees, it would gain valuable financial and business
information that would give it an advantage in future negotiations and also
create fears. Including this clause provides both firms with the confidence
necessary to collaborate and work together on the current project. He further
clarifies that occasions of such U.S. firms poaching the Indian firm’s employee
is rare. Moreover, in the rare instance this condition has been breached, the
Indian firm has preferred to “forgive” the U.S. firm (forgoing the penalty
amount), in light of the size of the business from the U.S. client. The
management officer emphasized that this condition has rarely been violated.
Interview with Management, supra note 112. Note that this quote echoes the
intuition and finding that Gilson, Sabel & Scott note as braiding—the
intertwining of formal and informal contracting practices that enable
cooperation in the innovation industries. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note
42.
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292
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293
Id. at 582–83.
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control.294 On the one hand, this litigation is a fight between open and
proprietary software models, which goes to the heart of our debate over
the belief that the future of digital technology depends upon our ability to
rein in expansive copyright and IP law. Even though the core allegation
is that Samsung has “slavishly copied” Apple,295 Apple is suing for
patent and trademark violations, and not copyright infringement.296 Using
this strategy further supports the argument that industry relies very little
on copyright.
Data proving industry progress is not dependent on IP law are
acutely needed. This Article addresses this critical gap and makes three
significant contributions. First, the evidence that progress in the software
industry does not depend upon IP protection provides proof that
information products will be produced even without IP protection. This
evidence of “IP without IP” from commercial industry relieves scholars
of any inquiry into the moral motivations of programmers, which had
stymied other studies in the past. For the first time, the requisite evidence
to limit expansive copyright is available.
Second, the comparative analysis provides policy-makers three
different data points that confirm industry values know-how rather than
formal IP rights. (a) Mann’s survey of venture capitalists, (b) Gilson’s
294

On the one hand, open software is at the heart of this battle because the type
of platform is the primary difference between Apple’s iPad (and iPhone) and
Samsung’s Galaxy Tab series. Apple’s iPad and iPhone are based on a closed
system model, proprietary software that severely limits users’ flexibility. In
contrast, an open source operating system (i.e., Google’s Android) powers
Samsung’s Galaxy Tab series, which is now challenging Apple’s dominance in
the smartphone market. But this battle for markets is on the other hand being
waged using IP infringement actions. In response to Samsung’s market
challenge, Apple has alleged that Samsung’s Tab violates its IP and has filed
suit in the United States. Samsung has countersued in Germany and Korea, and
the German court granted a preliminary injunction preventing Samsung from
selling its tablet in Europe. See Iwatani Kane Yukari & Ian Sherr, Apple:
Samsung Copied Design, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/art
icle/SB10001424052748703916004576271210109389154.html
(discussing
Apple’s 38-page suit against Samsung for “slavishly copying” Apple’s iPhone
and iPad in the U.S. District Court of Northern California in April 2011); Ian
Sherr, Apple Blocks Samsung Tablet in Most of EU, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904140604576 4984035
02419670.html; Philipp Grontzki, Samsung to Appeal Ban on Galaxy Tablet,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424
053111903918104576503703550686190.html.
295
Matt Warman, Apple sues Samsung for ‘slavish’ copying of iPhone and iPad,
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/apple
/8460300/Apple-sues-Samsung-for-slavish-copying-of-iPhone-and-iPad.html.
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comparative study of Silicon Valley and Route 128, and (c) Indian
software firms’ indifference to IP laws but determination to protect
know-how (through restrictions on employee movement), all clearly
point to one conclusion: tacit knowledge—the skill and experience
associated with creating, developing, and implementing an innovation—
rather than the formal conception is vital for industry.297
Third, this initial foray raises the interesting possibility of
checking for false causation and proceeding toward an actual causal
explanation for why the software industry flourishes where it does.
Scholars have been compelled to rely on “serendipity” or “historic
accident” as the root cause of software industry growth. For instance, as
Gilson explains, the California law barring covenants not to compete was
the “causal antecedent” for knowledge spillovers and the software
industry growth in Silicon Valley. This law, in turn, was serendipitously
passed many years ago; it was a “historical accident.”298 The data from
Indian industry confirms Gilson’s thesis that knowledge spillovers are
essential but checks the conclusion that a “law” (involving postemployment restrictions in this case) is the wellspring for industry.299
The Indian industrial district Mumbai clearly demonstrates that the law
prohibiting post-employment restrictions is not a causal antecedent for
the software industry to succeed in the long-term. Mumbai offered
identical legal protection for employee movements, but Bangalore’s
industry overtook that of Mumbai, even though the industry first took
root in Mumbai. Likewise, Silicon Valley overtook and displaced Route
128, even though the latter started out well ahead. Having identified false
causation, scholars can move toward a more accurate causal story for
industry growth.
Gilson relies on only the “law” as the causal antecedent for the
transfer of know-how. Indian data instead highlights business contracts,
an additional tool firms use to create the necessary culture for free
transfer of know-how. Moreover, contracting practice data—what firms
bargain to keep and give away at the negotiating table—provides
illuminating insights into what firms truly care about. Industry is not
waiting for a law created by historical accident in order to flourish.
Instead, through contracts, the industry is creating the legal rules it
requires (in turn, to shape the necessary business culture). Indeed, within
the region, the industry is contractually encouraging transfer of knowhow that neutralize any prohibitions against non-compete agreements.300
297

See Gilson, High Technology Districts, supra note 37, at 582.
Id. at 578.
299
Id.
300
Industry not only allows but also directly “enables” free employee mobility
to competitors in the region. See discussion on how firms encourage free
298
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Simultaneously, through a second set of contracts with another set of
parties (clients in the United States and in other regions), the same
industry limits employee movement and prevents transfer of know-how.
Proof that transfer of know-how via free employee movement is the
causal antecedent for the industry (rather than the laws providing
property protection for IP or non-compete restrictions) is corroborated by
multiple data sets. This initial foray raises tantalizing questions for future
work. By forbidding international clients from hiring away their
employees, are software firms ensuring India’s software knowledge
remains undiluted? In short, are they effectively forging the
infrastructure to perpetuate India’s advantage as the key center for
software in future?301 Presently, proceeding beyond happenstance
explanations provides policy-makers with accurate and inviting
possibilities to emulate Silicon Valley and the Elephant development
model.302

mobility by reimbursing new hires for any payments to past employers in lieu of
notice period supra Part III.B.
301
See also similar discussion on “second stage agglomeration economy”
whereby firms continue to benefit from geographical cluster beyond one product
cycle. Gilson, supra note 37, at 588.
302
India’s sluggish economic growth was earlier derided as the “[H]indu rate of
growth.” But subsequent to India’s rapid economic rise, it has earned the
moniker of “the Elephant,” much like “the Dragon” is used to represent China.
See also sources cited supra note 25.

